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Abstract
This thesis explores how different social and political 
interests frame interpretations and assessments of the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies among biomedical clinicians, 
infertile women seeking treatment, and feminist analysts— three 
important groups involved in the debate over the efficacy, safety 
and acceptability of conception-assisting technologies. Through 
a review of interdisciplinary secondary source data on risk and 
conception-assisting technologies, I detail the prevailing 
theories on risk, risk assessment and risk acceptability. I 
elaborate the particular perspectives on risk held by each of the 
three groups and the social and political influences which shape 
them. I also explore how differing conceptions of risk affect 
decision making and the acceptance of technology. I argue that 
to understand differing risk constructions it is necessary to 
understand the social, political, economic and cultural framework 
within which these risk determinations are made. This discussion 
of risk and conception-assisting technologies should be viewed 
and analyzed as part of a wider debate about socializing 
technology. It also makes way for more comparative sociological 
analyses of different groups' risk assessments of technological 
innovations.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
It would be strangely Innocent nowadays to imagine a society in 
which the discourse on risk is not politicized. Such a society 
would have to be lacking free debate without values. It would 
have to be without a forum for generating a shared ideology.
(Douglas, 1992: 13)
In our society, reproduction is seen as a central aspect of 
women's lives. Our biological capability to reproduce is shaped 
by our social and cultural values about conception, pregnancy, 
birth and child rearing, and on a societal level choices are made 
as to how reproduction is enacted and regulated (Overall, 1993). 
Reproduction is seen as "women's work" but the scientific and 
medical establishment, the agents of our social notions of 
procreation, see women's bodies as unfit for the task— imprecise, 
unpredictable, imperfect— and in need of improvement.
This assumption leads to the expansion of reproductive 
technologies as a way to improve on nature. Our societal view of 
procreation as of prime importance and even definitive of 
womanhood is reinforced by current medical practice which focuses 
on the enhancement of fertility through new reproductive 
technologies (Overall, 1993). Technologies created to assist 
conception, for example, have been presented in the media and by 
the biomedical establishment as a panacea for infertile couples.
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Yet, the expansion of conception-assisting technologies is 
contested by many groups because with these technologies new 
risks are created which may cause detrimental effects to women's 
health and autonomy, to the offspring born using new 
technologies, and to our societal structure itself. The debate 
over the use of conception-assisting technologies and their 
efficacy as treatments for infertility centres on questions of 
risk surrounding their use.
Risk is generally defined as the likelihood of some adverse 
outcome (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Palmer & Sainfort, 1993; 
Short, 1984). Risk is also an action— to chance the possibility 
of danger. . In contemporary society, questions about risk 
encompass much of the debate surrounding the acceptability of new 
technological developments, and analyses of risk are undertaken 
by experts and lay persons to anticipate, avoid, lessen or change 
the extent of uncertainty involved in making decisions about 
technological use (Hayes, 1992).
The debate over technological acceptance and the risks we 
face is about conflict over who has the authority to declare a 
particular conception of risk as the truth (Beck, 1992; Hayes, 
1992; Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993) . Defining risk in our society is 
therefore a struggle among rationality claims, and ideological 
commitments (Beck, 1992; Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982) . It is 
about public support for technological advances, and trust in the 
institutions which develop and manage technology. And, it is
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about power, who has the power to decide which risks society is 
willing to accept, and for what social, political and economic 
ends (Perrow, 1982).
According to Nelkin, defining risk is a way of 
"...explaining the failure of existing political or social 
relationships, of voicing mistrust, [and] of delegating blame" 
(1989: 98) . Discussions of risk are about more than danger to
health and happiness. They are also about credibility, trust, 
responsibility, and fairness; going beyond the statistics of the 
experts to the arena of public debate : "Instead of asking how
much risk is acceptable to you, the general question would be 
what kind of society do you want?" (Douglas, 1985: 14-15).
AIM OF THE THESIS: CALCULATING THE RISKS OF CONCEPTION-ASSISTING 
TECHNOLOGIES
The aim of this thesis is to examine the differing 
constructions of risk in biomedical, feminist and lay conceptions 
of conception-assisting technologies to better understand the 
ideological underpinnings of each groups' perspective. 
Conception-assisting technologies like in vitro fertilization and 
fertility drugs typify the risk and technological acceptance 
debate, and yet remain an area largely unexamined in current 
debates on risk. According to Mary Douglas (1992), social 
scientists have not undertaken the task of analyzing comparative
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conceptions of risk to explain differences in risk perception in 
our society. There have been few academic studies on the
differences between medical and non-medical conceptions of risk, 
or on how different groups in society define and construct the 
risks to society, and in their lives. In the case of conception- 
assisting technologies, there are varied discourses on risk from 
ethicists, philosophers, clergy, feminist analysts, physicians, 
bureaucrats, pharmaceutical companies, and the infertile women 
who use the technologies.
Analysis of differing conceptions of risk is important to
understanding perceived choices and consent to use conception-
assisting technologies. Three main groups in the debate:
biomedical clinicians, feminist analysts, and infertile women 
seeking treatment, all evaluate the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies, but their notions of risk are constructed 
differently. Their expressions of risk represent political 
interests— those who are for it minimize the individual risks and 
dangers to society, while those who contest its use bring the 
risks to the forefront of the debate. In their constructions 
they: "...affirm or challenge existing relationships of power and 
control" (Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993: 32) . Each group wants to
maintain, or promote, a particular world view in their assessment 
of the risks of conception-assisting technologies.
To understand the constructions of risk surrounding 
conception-assisting technologies formulated by each group I will
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detail the prevailing theories on risk, risk assessment, and risk 
acceptability which will guide the analysis of each group's risk 
conceptions. I will discuss the risk construction of each group 
revealing the influences on, and reasons for, their particular 
construction— the social, cultural, and political context in 
which they construct risk. I will also detail the risks each 
group highlights surrounding the use of conception-assisting 
technologies and explain how these affect decision making and 
acceptance of the technologies. Through this analysis I hope to 
contribute to a broader understanding of risk, risk analysis and 
technological acceptance, and the social context in which 
feminists, infertile women seeking treatment, and biomedical 
clinicians evaluate the risks arising from the use of conception- 
assisting technologies.
CONCEPTION-ASSISTING TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR USE IN CANADA
Before detailing the technologies available in Canada to aid 
conception, it is important to have an understanding of the 
prevalence of infertility in Canada. The Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies conducted the first comprehensive 
Canadian survey of infertility and found that eight and one half 
percent of couples (approximately 300,000 couples) aged 18 to 44, 
who were married or had been cohabiting for at least one year at 
the time of the survey, and who were not using contraception for
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that year, failed to have a pregnancy. Not using contraception 
for two years, seven percent of couples (approximately 250,000 
couples) failed to have a pregnancy. The one year time frame, 
commonly used by the medical profession, represents the time 
period in which most couples are expected to conceive. It is 
disputed by many, however, including the World Health 
Organization, because some couples who do not conceive in the 
first year, will in the second year. Thus, the Royal Commission 
used both time frames for clarity (Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1993).
There are many causes of infertility including sexually 
transmitted diseases, exposure to harmful agents in the 
environment or the workplace, and smoking. Fertility also 
declines with age (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993). Infertility can also be iatrogenic, 
resulting from previous medical interventions: drugs, surgery,
diagnostic tests, or medical devices like lUDs (Corea, 1985) .
There are a number of conception-assisting technologies used 
in Canada to help infertile couples have babies. Many women use 
fertility drugs dispensed by a specialist or their family 
physician. Fertility drugs are hormones that affect the 
reproductive system, generally helping to induce ovulation in 
women, or increase the production of sperm in men. The number of 
women who use fertility drugs to treat infertility is difficult 
to ascertain because most often the drugs are not dispensed at
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specialized centres, but instead, by a couple's general 
practitioner. Fertility drugs are usually the first treatment 
used to combat infertility (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993).
One of the most advanced conception-assisting technologies 
is in vitro fertilization (IVF) . IVF has received most of the 
attention in the critical discourse on new reproductive 
technologies. IVF is a technique which involves the surgical 
removal of mature oocytes (eggs) from a woman's ovaries, usually 
after the administration of a fertility drug to induce ovulation 
(or hyperovulation) . The eggs are then fertilized with sperm in 
vitro (in glass) in a laboratory. Fertilized eggs are placed in 
the woman's uterus, where ideally, they will implant allowing 
normal pregnancy and delivery to occur (Stephens & McLean, 1993).
Two variations on IVF are also used in Canada. The first, 
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) involves the same removal 
of a woman's eggs, but instead of being mixed with sperm in a 
laboratory, the eggs and sperm are reintroduced into the 
fallopian tubes in a surgical procedure called laparoscopy. 
Fertilization, if it occurs, takes place in vivo (in the body), 
and requires fewer laboratory facilities. It is however, only 
suitable for women who do not have blockages of the fallopian 
tubes (Stephens & McLean, 1993). The second, zygote
intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT) involves taking a fertilized egg, 
obtained through IVF, and transferring it to the fallopian tube
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usually via a catheter threaded through the uterus under 
ultrasound guidance (Stephens & McLean, 1993). The three 
procedures vary only slightly, so for simplicity the term IVF 
will be used to encompass all three techniques throughout the 
thesis.
It should also be noted that throughout this thesis the term 
conception-assisting technologies will only refer to fertility 
drugs and IVF. It does not include artificial insemination, any 
use of donated gametes, or any conception-assisting technology 
that does not result in genetically-related children.
Stephens and McLean (1993), in their survey of Canadian 
fertility programs for the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies provided a detailed picture of the provision of 
conception-assisting technologies in Canada 1991 (1993). They
found seventeen clinics offering IVF services in Canada, 
including both teaching and other hospitals, and one independent 
clinic.^ Geographically, the services were clustered in central 
Canada with one third of all clinics located in Ontario (all of 
which were located in Southern Ontario). This distribution would 
suggest disparities in access to IVF procedures, evidenced by the 
fact that of the approximately 2,900 couples using IVF, 70
 ̂There were 15 programs offering IVF, 6 offering GIFT and 2 ZIFT programs in 
1992. The programs were not static however, with some clinics adding and 
removing procedures when they felt it was necessary (i.e. due to availability 
of laboratory facilities, or personnel) (Stephens & McLean, 1993) .
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percent were from Ontario, though Ontario accounted for only 37 
percent of Canada's population in 1991 (Stephens & McLean, 1993).
Couples generally had to wait four weeks or less for an 
initial assessment, though the wait was as long as thirty weeks 
in clinics outside of central Canada. It would seem that the 
demand for IVF services is high. In addition to medical 
unsuitability for IVF, some clinics rejected women for treatment 
on other criteria: being a lesbian, or a single woman, or through 
demonstrating "doubtful parenting ability", though how this was 
assessed is uncertain. Certainly, some clinics do exercise the 
power to decide who is socially suitable to reproduce (Stephens & 
McLean, 1993).
Stephens and McLean (1993) report that the protocols, 
procedures and actual practices of conception-assisting programs 
vary a great deal, despite the fact that there have been 
standards and guidelines established for some treatments by 
Canadian biomedical governing bodies. This is evidenced by the 
variability in definitions of success for IVF. In 1991, half of 
the IVF clinics defined success through the achievement of 
pregnancy, determined by a chemical test. The birth of a live 
child (the definition of success for most infertile couples) was 
a distant second definition of success by the programs. What was 
communicated to patients was a statistical success rate, but this 
was not accompanied by any indication of how the rate was 
determined in many cases. It could be the number of pregnancies
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per treatment- cycle (which has varying definitions), or the 
number of live births per couple, or some other rate, leading 
Stephens and McLean to question how fully informed couples are 
about the possibility of success. In fact, they found that
generally, IVF is not successful. In 1991, 18 to 26 percent of 
attempts resulted in pregnancy, and 10 to 20 percent of attempts 
resulted in a live birth. There were 609 pregnancies in 1991, 
which resulted in 189 live births— this out of approximately 
2,900 couples enrolled in IVF programs (Stephen & McLean, 1993).
The findings of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies concerning IVF and fertility drugs are also worthy 
of note here. It concluded that the way IVF is currently offered 
is unacceptable :
• It was being used for indications for which there was little 
evidence that it was effective.
• There was a marked difference in how services were offered in 
different clinics, often without the provision of clear and 
understandable information for patients.
• Record keeping was found to be unsatisfactory and insufficient 
to assess the outcomes: i.e. number of children born, and the 
long-term health of women and children.
• Voluntary guidelines for practice were not being adhered to 
(Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993).
The Commission also found that fertility drugs are being 
dispensed for unapproved indications and dosages, there are
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 1
possible unknown long- and short-term side effects which have not 
been assessed, and some drugs are being prescribed which have not 
been found effective in treating infertility. It recommends 
better regulation, and licensing through the creation of a 
National Reproductive Technologies Commission to ensure the 
provision of safe and effective technologies for Canadians (Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993) . To date, 
none of the recommendations of the Commission have been enacted 
in law by the Federal government, though legislation to curb the 
commercialization of certain new reproductive technologies has 
been introduced in the House of Commons in 1996.
METHODOLOGY
Determining Differing Constructions
The main focus of this thesis is an analysis and 
interpretation of what is detailed and what is omitted in the 
conceptions of risk put forward by feminist analysts, biomedical 
clinicians, and women seeking infertility treatment, to better 
understand the moral, social and political interests each group 
conveys about the use of conception-assisting technologies. 
Feminist analysts, infertile women seeking treatment, and 
biomedical clinicians are three important groups involved in the 
debate about the efficacy, safety and acceptability of these new 
reproductive technologies. Their conceptions of the risks both
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reflect and reinforce their values and beliefs about biomedicine 
and technological acceptcince, and lend understanding to the roots 
of their ideological positions.
Secondary source literature which addresses the use of 
conception-assisting technologies in terms of the risk 
conceptions of each group is reviewed. A variety of secondary 
sources were used in the analysis of each group's construction of 
risk. These include:
1. An interdisciplinary collection of feminist writings on 
conception-assisting technologies, infertility, and biomedicine 
which provide detailed critiques of patriarchal attitudes about 
reproduction and the use of conception-assisting technologies. 
The feminist literature represents a wide array of perspectives 
on the development and use of conception-assisting technologies, 
and reflects the main arguments of feminist analysts on this 
subject.
2. Writings on risk, risk assessment, and risk perception from a 
number of fields including epidemiology, anthropology, economics, 
sociology, geography and psychology to provide an understanding 
of the prevailing theories of risk.
3. Works examining infertility, medicalization, and the culture 
of biomedical practice to detail how biomedical clinicians 
construct risk. Current literature predominately from biomedical 
journals detailing the risks of conception-assisting technologies 
in clinical settings was employed. The aim was to detail
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biomedical clinicians' conceptions of risk based on how 
conception-assisting technologies are actually used since 
clinicians necessarily construct risk based on their experiences 
with the technology.
4. Selective accounts by feminist, sociological and 
anthropological researchers summarizing the experiences of 
infertile women (and couples) with infertility and conception- 
assisting technologies. Also used were accounts from infertile 
women themselves (which should not viewed as representative of 
all infertile women seeking treatment) and informational books 
directed at infertile couples to help them understand the options 
available to them. While interviews with infertile women would 
have provided the best data on their conceptions of risk, this 
was beyond the scope of the thesis.
Using these secondary sources, the following themes were 
explored to determine each group's construction of risk:
1. The experiences of each group with health care, infertility, 
conception-assisting technologies, and their attitudes toward 
biomedicine were evaluated.
2. The ideological stance of each group was examined. Each group 
has a vested interest in portraying the risks associated with 
conception-assisting technologies the way they do. What is the 
motivation.for each group's conception of risk?
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3. Views on risk in general were evaluated. Is it an 
individual's prerogative to take risk, or should risk taking have 
a social dimension?
4. What does each group believe are the important components to 
weighing the risks of conception-assisting technologies? What 
knowledge do they rely on about the technologies used?
Additional data and insights were gained from primary 
sources including the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies which provided recent Canadian data to supplement 
secondary sources. Also, I visited IVF Canada, a Toronto IVF 
clinic, and attended a Lakehead Infertility Awareness Group 
meeting which featured a presentation on conception-assisting 
technologies and infertility by a physician and nurse from the 
Thunder Bay Assisted Reproduction Centre. Written information 
given to patients at the IVF clinic and those attending the 
infertility awareness group meeting was collected and used to 
supplement secondary sources.
In using secondary sources, I am in fact "constructing" each 
group's construction of risk. Many of the sources cited in this 
thesis do not address risk directly, but instead discuss the 
political, social, and cultural values of each group. This 
thesis provides a basis from which primary data may be obtained. 
It is a comprehensive first step toward a fuller understanding of 
the conceptions of risk in biomedical, feminist and lay 
perceptions of conception-assisting technologies. It also
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provides a framework for the comparative analysis of other risk 
constructions as part of a critique of the societal acceptance of 
technological innovations.
Plan of the Thesis
Chapter Two provides a theoretical background on the notion 
of risk. Beginning with an explanation and critique of technical 
risk assessment methodologies, it posits an alternative to this 
form of risk assessment which takes into consideration the social 
constructions of risk conceptions. The chapter concludes with an 
explanation of how people generally construct notions of risk, 
and make decisions about taking risks.
Chapter Three outlines the risk construction of feminist 
analysts surrounding the use of conception-assisting 
technologies. It begins with an explanation of the social 
context and ideological underpinnings which guide feminist 
analysts' extensive critiques of biomedicine, reproduction, and 
new reproductive technologies. It continues by delineating the 
risks detailed in feminist writings beginning with the risks to 
individual women who use conception-assisting technologies. This 
is followed by an examination of the technologies in a wider 
social context and the risks they may hold for women as a group—  
a group whose status is shaped by existing patriarchal social 
relations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the debate
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among feminist analysts on how to respond to these risks in an 
effort to promote women's reproductive autonomy.
Infertile women's conceptions of risk are detailed in 
Chapter Four. To get a better understanding of the influences on 
this group's risk construction, typical experiences of the 
involuntarily childless and the parenthood motivations of 
infertile couples are examined. The decision-making process of 
infertile couples surrounding their options is discussed, 
centring specifically around the medicalization of infertility 
and the decision to seek treatments using conception-assisting 
technologies. This is followed by a discussion of infertile 
women's conceptions of risk before and during the treatment 
process.
Chapter Five examines the risk construction of biomedical 
clinicians and the important role they play in influencing lay 
risk conceptions. It begins with an explanation of the culture 
of biomedical practice and the particular perspective of 
infertility specialists. Biomedical definitions of infertility 
and the treatment process are then detailed to show the 
biomedical lens through which infertility is viewed. The 
construction of risk by biomedical clinicians is explored through 
an investigation of the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies found in biomedical literature.
The conclusion (Chapter Six) details the research findings, 
showing how the vested interests of each group influence their
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constructions of risk. It is followed by a discussion of 
something all three groups neglect in their risk constructions—  
the current mechanisms of societal technological choice and 
acceptance, and how they can be transformed to better socialize 
technology. The thesis concludes with suggestions for further 
research and a statement concerning the significance of this 
study.




How are assessments of risk made? What does it mean to say 
a particular activity or technology is risky? Most scientific 
and social scientific disciplines study risk and each is 
constrained by its choice of methods (Douglas, 1985). According 
to Hayes (1992), this results in a lack of conceptual coherence 
leading to definitions and uses of risk which vary within and 
across disciplines. In this chapter the concept of risk will be 
elaborated in order to create a framework which will guide the 
analysis of varying constructions of risk surrounding conception- 
assisting technologies in subsequent chapters.
TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
The most conventional model^ of risk analysis— technical or 
expert assessment— is a product of statistics, epidemiology, 
engineering and economics, and uses quantitative, probabilistic 
methods (Firoino, 1989). Emerging out of the need to examine the 
risks of new technological discoveries, in order to make 
recommendati'ons to policy makers and business people about
 ̂ For exëurple, the May 1996 issue of Discover magazine, devoted entirely to 
the topic of risk, discusses various risks almost solely from a technical 
assessment perspective.
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potential hazards, it epitomizes the hegemony of positivistic 
science, especially through its desire to eliminate uncertainty 
by predicting the risks we face (Hayes, 1992) .
In technical constructions of risk, the danger has to be 
quantifiable so the probability of hazard can be determined. 
Measures like death and disease rates, lost work days and 
economic cost/benefit analyses are favoured (Short, 1984; Starr, 
1994). Usually the analyses involve some comparison of the 
derived social benefit (converted into a dollar or numerical 
value) with the risks of a particular activity (typically defined 
as fatalities per person per hour of exposure) (Cutter, 1993; 
Starr, 1994) . In epidemiology, risk is a statement of 
statistical probability— the estimated frequency of an event 
(usually disease or death) under certain conditions of exposure 
in the population (e.g., one in nine women will get breast cancer 
over their lifetimes) (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994) . Risk is 
therefore conceptualized as the expected number of fatalities, or 
other adverse consequences due to a particular activity or use of 
a technology— it is numerically defined, and scientifically 
derived (Firoino, 1989) .
To quantify risk in a world that is often complex and 
unpredictable, technical assessments rely on sophisticated models 
of the 'real world' through the creation of artificial scenarios 
requiring many simplifying assumptions:
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[A]dult human beings live exactly 70 years, stay 
indoors all day in radon-contaminated homes, drink 
precisely seven cups of water a day, smoke very heavily 
or not at all, and exercise while inhaling abnormal 
quantities of airborne pollutants (Jasanoff, 1993:
124) .
The reliability and validity of these models is absolutely 
important for accurate measurement of risk, so generally 
technical risk methodologies are designed to provide over­
estimates rather than underestimates of risk (Lave, 1994; Short,
1984).
The use of quantitative data and probability statistics 
gives technical risk the aura of objectivity, rationality and 
legitimacy (Firoino, 1989) . Assessments are based on hard 
"facts", statistical data, and tested scientific assumptions. 
"Experts" assert that technical assessments represent the risks 
we face as they really are: unbiased and objective (Jasanoff,
1993; Nelkin, 1989; Starr, 1994).
Criticisms of the Technical Risk Model
The creation and maintenance of expertise places technical 
risk conceptions at the top of a hierarchy which ultimately 
reduces the value of other constructions of risk, and ignores the 
political and emotional motivations experts have for constructing 
risks the way they do (Beck, 1992; Cutter, Tiefenbacher & 
Solecki, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This inevitably leads 
to conflict usually with the public, though it occurs within the
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technical risk community as well. The public is viewed by
"experts" as being motivated by more than the facts. Individuals 
are condemned for making judgments about risk based on their 
emotions and political motivations. Some experts believe lay 
people should defer judgment on issues of technological
acceptance and management to experts (Cutter, Tiefenbacher & 
Solecki, 1992; Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982). Experts view
members of the public who question their objectively ascertained 
facts as irrational, prey to their emotions, weak in 
probabilistic thinking, ignorant and motivated by subjective 
political goals (Gillick, 1988; Douglas, 1992).
Conflicts between expert and lay conceptions of risk 
demonstrate that risk cannot solely be determined using the 
technical model. Some important criticisms of technical risk 
assessment further illustrate this point. First, technical risk 
calculations neglect what is referred to as higher order impacts- 
-risks beyond death and disease rates. These risks include: 
damage to the public's faith in institutions or politicians; the 
aesthetic value of the physical environment; social changes 
resulting from technological advances; emotional distress; or
quality of life issues (Kasperson, et. al., 1994; Nelkin, 1989; 
Slovic, 1994). The range of risks examined in technical 
assessments .is exceedingly narrow, focusing on very few of the 
things people value (Short, 1984) . Also, technical models cannot 
assess risks that are completely unknown at the present, only
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those which enter the sphere of the research: How can one
examine the risk of a cancer which has not yet been discovered? 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
A second criticism of technical risk assessment is that it 
assumes only one kind of rationality for thinking about risk. 
Risk is treated as a unidimensional, technical, probabilistic 
concept, thus ignoring the many other layers of meaning the term 
has in popular discourse (Hayes, 1992). The contention that 
Icnowledge gained from technical methods is sufficient for making 
decisions about technological acceptance reflects scientific 
imperialism in conveying what risks it is in the public interest 
to know (Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982; Short, 1984).
The assumption of a single risk rationality leads into the 
third criticism, that technical risk assessment’s claim to being 
apolitical is false. By asserting objectivity and rationality, 
technical risk analyses also ignore the social, cultural, and 
political influences on the scientists themselves. Monetary or 
reputation pressures, company policies and ideologies, for 
example, all influence which questions are pursued and how 
results are used in the assessment of risks. Also, risk 
assessment is often plagued by incomplete information requiring 
guesswork and judgment calls by scientists themselves 
(Freudenberq, 1994). Expert risk assessors assert they are 
bracketing out "...the grime and heat of politics.... to get at 
the real essence of risk perception before it is polluted by
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interests and ideology" (Douglas, 1992: 11) . They are, in fact, 
asserting an ideological stance of their own; that risk 
assessments and societal technological choice can be achieved 
through clearly measurable, objective means.
CONFLICT WITH THE PUBLIC
In our society, organizations generally set the terms of 
debate concerning risk acceptability. Technical risk experts 
assess the magnitude of danger, and influence the choices policy 
makers, business and industry make concerning the allocation of 
resources and risks (Clarke & Short, 1993). The apolitical, 
objective stance taken in technical risk analysis is precisely 
what leads to conflict between experts and lay people over the 
risks we face. Experts fault the public for assessing risk based 
on the very notions they themselves purport to ignore: social,
cultural and moral ideals about our world. Also, according to 
the experts, the public is merely uninformed; if people had all 
of the facts, they would understand that the risks they fear are 
no worse than the possible dangers of smoking, driving or skiing 
(Beck, 1992).
So why do members of the public fear toxic waste storage in 
their own neighbourhoods, seek compensation for failed medical 
devices like silicon breast implants, or demand that dairy 
products using bovine growth hormone be clearly labelled, when
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experts assert they pose no risks to health? Raynor and Cantor 
(1987), suggest that the central question is not solely the 
technical assessment of "'How safe is safe enough?"', but a 
larger assessment of "'How fair is safe enough?' " (1987: 5).
Because decision making is held in the hands of very few, the 
validity of technical risk claims, and processes under which 
risky decisions are made fuel public concerns about risk. Those 
who will be exposed to risk must feel they were consulted, that 
courses of action were collectively determined, and that those 
who will regulate the technology are worthy of trust (Raynor & 
Cantor, 1987) . This means confidence in institutions, and the 
credibility of the information given to the public, are often the 
issues in debates over risk and technological acceptance (Clarke 
& Short, 1993; Wildavsky & Drake, 1994).
Also, according to Slovic (1994), lay people can assess 
risks very much like technical risk experts when asked. They 
know and understand annual fatality rates surrounding the use of 
various technologies and understand concepts like the use of 
nuclear power plants result in fewer deaths annually than driving 
a car. Lay people's constructions of risk are not built from 
micro-world simulations however, catastrophic potential threats 
to future generations and other characteristics are taken into 
consideration. To lay people, risk is more than annual fatality 
rates.
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Moreover, members of the public have become experts when
particular technological hazards affect them. Even armed with
the experts' studies, they often still refute their claims. They
combine technical and theoretical knowledge with knowledge about
their particular situation often giving them a fuller knowledge
of the situation (Jasanoff, 1993). Clarke and Short (1993)
explain that lay people are in fact very rational, but in non-
obvious ways which are neglected by technical risk methodologies
centring on probabilistic and cost-benefit approaches to
determining risk.
Finally, in disputing the experts, the public is saying:
"This is not how we want to live":
The non-acceptance of scientific definition of risks is 
not something to be reproached as 'irrationality' in 
the population; but quite to the contrary it indicates 
that the cultural premises of acceptability contained 
in scientific and technical statements on risk are 
wrong [original emphasis] (Beck, 1992: 58) .
The lay public's risk assessments are very rich and detailed, not 
irrational, and illustrate the political nature of risk 
assessment and technological acceptance as a struggle between 
differing knowledge claims. It would seem that "...just as 
scientists' estimates may need to be treated with something less
than reverence, the views of the public may need to be treated
with something better than contempt" (Freudenberg, 1994: 250-
251) . This suggests that a better model of risk is necessary to 
understand how differing constructions of risk occur.
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AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF RISK
Mary Douglas, a pioneer in the study of risk, asserts that 
conceiving risk as a social construction is the best way to 
understand risk perception by all groups in society because it 
provides the widest view of the possible range of goals that 
people are trying to achieve in constructing risk the way they do 
(Douglas, 1992). A cultural theory of risk was originally 
introduced by. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in Risk and 
Culture (1982). They asserted that people do not have objective 
risks flung upon them which they merely perceive, but are instead 
active organizers of their perceptions and thereby construct 
risks (Wildavsky & Dake, 1994) . For them, perceptions of risk 
reflect underlying assumptions and values, and are shaped by 
social and cultural mechanisms like blame, social criticism, 
world views and ideology. These deeply held values and beliefs 
which defend social positions are what Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982) call cultural biases.
The cultural theory of risk is premised on the notion that 
individuals construct risks (or what is considered hazardous) to 
support their way of life (Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Wildavsky & Dake, 1994) . Risk does not exist solely as an 
objective feature of our physical world; it is a construct which 
we use to characterize parts of our society (Jasanoff, 1993) .
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 7
This means hazards are an interpretation of events that are 
observed, then characterized as unwanted, and communicated to 
others (Clarke & Short, 1993; Renn, et al., 1992). Risks are
made no less real by their social construction. In fact, it 
makes many of the differences between experts and various 
constituencies of the lay public more clear: "This argument is 
not about the reality of the dangers, but about how they are 
politicized" (Douglas, 1992: 29)
That risk is an interpreted subjective experience means risk 
conceptions are shaped by social, political, economic, and 
cultural forces (Cutter, 1993; Dutton, 1988; Kaufert & O'Neil,
1993). What information people choose to believe, trust in the 
information provider, personal values, social experiences, 
institutional affiliations, and the social and historical context 
in which decisions are being made are some of the myriad of
influences shaping risk construction (Jasanoff, 1993; Otway & von 
Winterfeldt, 1982).
It is argued that conceiving of risk as socially constructed 
better reflects how risk is assessed. It represents a 
sophisticated attempt to integrate information about risk into
meaningful blocks of information (Jasanoff, 1993). And, it 
allows us to discover and analyze the assumptions or omissions of 
the variables necessary for risk assessment. For example, in 
their analysis of a verbal exchange between an Inuit woman and a 
physician about the risks of childbirth, Kaufert & O'Neil (1993)
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found that the physician at first cited "objective", 
scientifically-derived risk statistics to emphasize the fact that 
he viewed childbirth as risky in the far north. When the Inuit 
woman questioned the relevance of his statistics, he illustrated 
the dangers by using case examples from his personal experience—  
that he had seen seven women die in childbirth. His conceptions 
of risk were then shaped by the statistics, his experiences, and 
his interpretation of them. His risk construction also 
reinforced his political view that childbirth in the remote north 
without a physician present is full of risks and should not be 
allowed (Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993). The physician took the 
statistics about maternal mortality, interpreted them and used 
them to support his claim about the risks. His dialogue on risks 
was full of emotions and politics; it was not wholly objective 
and scientific.
Constructing Risk
Following this inclusive model of risk perception, the 
mechanisms people use to construct risk can now be delineated. 
When faced with situations which have elements of risk, people 
incorporate many different variables in their assessments, and 
subsequent construction of the risks of technologies or 
activities. Constructions of risk are shaped by one's 
experiences and the context of one's life, and the circumstances
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and constraints that impinge upon them and shape one's view of 
the world (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994) . It is important to note 
that views of risk are therefore not homogeneous. The debate 
about the acceptance of technology, risks, and choice is not only 
between the experts and the public, but also within the public 
and the expert realms as well.
To construct risk, information about the activity or 
technology is needed. People rely on formal information from 
experts, advertising, media, product labelling, self-help books, 
and pamphlets and advocacy group information. They also have 
access to informal information through personal contacts: family, 
friends, and co-workers (Cutter, 1993; Douglas, 1992; Nelkin, 
1989).
According to Otway and von Winterfeldt (1982), attributes of 
technologies themselves also influence the construction of risk. 
People generally make the following assessments when faced with 
decisions about risk and technological acceptance:
• Is exposure to risk involuntary as opposed to taking risks at 
one's own choice?
• Is there personal control over the outcome of the risk 
exposure, or is one at the mercy of others?
• How certain is one about the probabilities or consequences of 
exposure? Do the experts agree?
• How much personal experience with the risks of the technology 
does one have?
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• How difficult is it to imagine the risks of exposure?
• Are there delayed somatic effects of present risk exposure?
• Are there genetic effects of present risk exposure which will 
threaten future generations?
• What is the likelihood of catastrophic accidents?
• Is the burden of the risks fairly distributed? (i.e.. Will the 
benefits go to others, but the risks to us?)
• What is the likelihood of accidents caused by human failure 
rather than natural causes? (Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982) .
Economic, social, political and cultural considerations are 
also integrated into constructions of risk: Does the new
technology provide jobs? Will it increase our standard of 
living? Will it concentrate power and create dependence on a 
small elite group? Does it meet the purported need? These wider 
social questions come into play, but which questions are asked is 
dependent on one's cultural framework and motivations (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982).
Taking Risks
In deciding to use new technological advances, individuals 
and groups have decided to take risks. Risk taking involves more 
than just danger, however, because the outcomes of technology 
have both positive and negative possibilities. Douglas (1992) 
asserts that risk was originally deemed neutral— the probability
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of an action occurring, taking account of the magnitude of losses 
or gains that would result. According to Hayes (1992), the 
present conception of risk as danger is problematic since it 
assumes the risk-taker has not fully understood the possible 
negative outcomes (as assigned by an external risk-assessor), 
allowing her/his actions to be judged as irrational or bad. 
Analysis of both the negative and the positive aspects of a 
particular action allows for a better understanding of the risk- 
taker' s motivations because the real or perceived benefits of the 
activity may more than compensate for its dangerous aspects in 
the individual's calculation of risk. Risk, therefore, does not 
only mean hazard, but also is an assessment of both the losses 
and gains that could result from a particular activity— it may 
have both good and bad outcomes.
This means decisions about risks are taken by weighing and 
comparing many good and bad possibilities, and choosing what we 
can and cannot live with (Douglas, 1992) . Decisions about the 
risks of a particular technology are put in context with all of 
the other risks we face (from nature, society and all other 
technologies we are exposed to) . The risks of inaction must be 
weighed against the dangers of action; the benefits of a 
technology may be high enough for its hazards to be accepted 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Otway & von Winterfeldt, 1982). Even 
a very high likelihood of danger may be accepted if the results 
are conceived of as very desirable (Douglas, 1985).
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Risk-taking decisions are best conceptualized as a gamble, 
since the ultimate outcome is unknown when the decision is made 
(Palmer & Sainfort, 1993) . The assessment of both gains and 
losses from a particular action allows the risk-taker to actively 
construct and evaluate the risk. Risk assessment is therefore 
not something thrust on the actor by an external expert, but is 
something constructed using one's own knowledge base, and the 
variety of political, social, cultural and economic elements 
which influence it (Hayes, 1992; Palmer & Sainfort, 1993).
CONCLUSION
Differing models of risk assessment have led to many
conflicts both within the academic community, and between the 
"experts" and the public as well. A predominant method of risk 
assessment is technical, in which objective, scientific, usually 
statistical methods are used to determine the risks of particular 
activities or technologies. While proponents of technical risk 
assessment assert that they represent risks as they really are, 
such models have met with criticism. Critics assert that
technical risk assessments neglect to measure risks outside death 
and disease rates, and that these statistical abstractions have
little meaning in the "real world". They also contend that
technical risk constructions are themselves not objective, but 
are influenced by social, political and ideological beliefs and
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constraints, including the contention that risks can be 
objectively ascertained.
This objective apolitical stance of technical risk assessors 
leads to conflict with the lay public as it is often their lives 
which will be affected by the possible risks of technology. 
Technical risk assessments often neglect things which are 
important to the lay public who question the credibility of 
evidence which is not collectively determined in a truly 
democratic decision-making process.
In response to these conflicts between the so-called experts 
and the lay public, social scientists have put forth a more 
inclusive model of risk assessment. This model is premised on 
the belief that risk assessments are shaped by the underlying 
assumptions and values of the risk assessor. This makes the 
conflict between the experts and the public not one about facts 
and statistics per se, but rather about how facts and statistics 
are interpreted and politicized. Determinations of risk 
therefore are constructed; shaped by social, cultural, political 
and economic forces, and varying sources of information, 
including attributes of technologies themselves.
Decisions about technological acceptance mean that 
individuals and groups have decided to take risks. Risk taking 
has both negative and positive possibilities, and means there 
must be an assessment of both losses and gains. This is done by 
weighing the good and bad possibilities, their likelihood, and
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their magnitude in context with all of the other risks we face. 
The risks of inaction must also be considered, as deciding not to 
take risks may have negative and positive ramifications as well. 
Decisions about taking risks are not merely determined for 
individuals by external experts, but are the result of a myriad 
of influences.
The construction of risk surrounding the use of conception- 
assisting technologies parallels other debates about
technological acceptance. The next three chapters will explore
the risk constructions of three influential groups in society—
feminist analysts, infertile women seeking treatment, and 
biomedical clinicians. Each group assesses the risks of
conception-assisting technologies differently because of their 
particular societal view on the technology, especially their 
ideological stances. These point to a number of vested interests 
of each group. Through their risk assessments all three groups 
make pronouncements about the acceptability of conception- 
assisting technologies.
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Chapter Three 
Feminist Conceptions of Risk
Shulamith Firestone, in her book The Dialectic of Sex 
(1970), was the first feminist analyst to assert that 
reproductive technology would eventually be the means through 
which patriarchal control of women's bodies would crumble. 
Firestone argued that patriarchy is rooted in the biological 
inequality of the sexes and that: "The heart of woman's
oppression is her childbearing and child rearing roles" (1970: 
81). According to Firestone (1970), the distinction between men 
and women, fundamentally based on this inequality, would only 
disappear through artificial reproduction which would inevitably 
undermine the whole family structure and division of labour in 
our society, alleviating women from the burden of childbearing 
and child rearing. The biological differences between the sexes 
would no longer matter if conception, gestation and birth 
occurred outside of women's bodies.
Firestone's naive trust in technology to achieve women's 
liberation has been vigorously criticized by feminists re­
examining her earlier arguments from the vantage point of two 
decades of reflection on the development and impact of new 
reproductive technologies like IVF and fertility drugs on women
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(Sydie, 1988; Tong, 1989). While present day feminists contend 
that her vision of women's liberation has not come to fruition, 
it is also likely Firestone herself would be less idealistic 
about the benefits of technology were she writing today. And as 
with most feminists, she would likely argue that the development 
of reproductive technologies has created new risks for women. 
Skepticism over the development and use of conception-assisting 
technologies, in particular fertility drugs and IVF, is evidenced 
by the extensive critical writings by feminist analysts in which 
the many risks entailed in the use of conception-assisting 
technologies are exposed.
Generally, feminist research and activism has at its core 
the goal of ending the sexist oppression of women through change 
to our cultural concepts, language and ways of knowing the world 
(Sydie, 1988) . Because of their goals, feminist theorists' 
analyses of risk, according to Cutter (1993), differ in many ways 
from traditional risk assessment. First, feminists have 
broadened the discourse on the differential burden of risks that 
are placed on particular groups, especially women. Second, they 
have incited action to influence how risk acceptability is 
determined. Third, feminists have changed how hazards are 
identified and assessed. And fourth, they have organized 
outright resistance to new technologies which have, in their 
view, unacceptable risks.
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But, while the feminist construction of risk surrounding the 
use of conception-assisting technologies has been both unique and 
thorough, within feminism there are differing views on, and 
responses to, • the threats posed by reproductive technologies. 
These differences have led to distinct forms of critique and 
political praxis, and stem from ideological disagreement amongst 
feminist analysts concerning the roots of women's oppression and 
the changes which are necessary to achieve women's liberation.
One of two key groups^ analyzing conception-assisting 
technologies are liberal feminists (e.g., Birke, Himmelweit & 
Vines, Overall, and Warren) who emphasize the expansion of 
individual women's autonomy. Liberal feminists are aware of the 
physical, social, and emotional risks of conception-assisting 
technologies but feel they can be managed or regulated using 
legislative means. Their response to the risks is to create a 
structure in which women can make free and informed choices about 
using conception-assisting technologies. They believe that women 
should be given the opportunity to use conception-assisting 
technologies if they choose, and that access to the technologies 
should be expanded to all women who desire them.
The other group, radical feminists, view the risks quite 
differently. Radical feminists like Corea, Klein, Raymond, and
 ̂ For heuristic purposes I am using the labels "liberal feminist" and "radical 
feminist" to delineate the two main feminist perspectives on conception- 
assisting technologies. These divisions are in some ways artificial since the 
perspectives of each group sometimes overlap, and because there are divergent 
views within each group as well.
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Hanmer, believe that conception-assisting technologies threaten 
the autonomy of women as a group. They assert that those in the 
male dominated biomedical sphere place the safety and interests 
of women behind their own desire to make babies using 
reproductive technologies. They assert that women are being made 
test-sites for dangerous pharmaceuticals and technological 
interventions which threaten to further entrench male control
over women. Radical feminists also assert that legislative 
structures are unreliable for instituting change for women. 
Their evidence is the state's long history of failing women 
through its complacent acceptance of biomedical doctrine.
These differing ideological stances within feminism do not 
detract from feminist analyses of the risks of conception-
assisting technologies. All feminists analysts are guided by the 
same goal of ending the sexist oppression of women. Their 
differing ideological stances demonstrate how change can occur on 
many different levels, and how political views motivate risk 
construction, and subsequent action.
However, it is important to remember that while feminist
analysts' writings on the risks of conception-assisting
technologies are innovative and thorough, they do not
comprehensively examine all possible risks. Risk assessment is 
shaped by ideological assumptions, cultural and social forces, 
and political motivations. This means feminist analysts'
constructions of risk are shaped by their views of women.
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biomedicine, our society, and their vested interests— they are 
mainly concerned with risks that threaten women's autonomy and 
liberation— either collectively or as individuals (Strickler, 
1992). The ontological status of the embryo, threats to the 
structure of the family, and religious objections, for example, 
are either discounted or ignored completely by feminist analysts, 
because these risk constructions are counter or tangential to 
their goal. Feminist interpretations of the risks of conception- 
assisting technologies are unique in that they cover topics that 
are generally neglected, and they challenge other risk 
constructions by looking not only at the risk to the users of the 
technology, but also to women as a group, and often society as a 
whole (Overall, 1987; Strickler, 1992).
This chapter begins with a comprehensive review of the risks 
of conception-assisting technologies detailed by feminist 
analysts. I concentrate on IVF̂ , beginning with the risks of the 
procedures themselves, and then moving to the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies when their use is examined in a 
wider social context. The radical and liberal feminist responses 
to these risks will also be outlined. These range from calls for 
an outright ban on technologies like IVF, to liberal feminist 
models of a caring, risk lessening provision of conception- 
assisting technologies.
* IVF is considered by feminist analysts to be the most invasive and risky 
conception-assisting technology which is why most writings concentrate on this 
procedure. See for example, Corea, 1985; Klein, 1989; Spallone, 1989.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
4 0
RISKS ARISING FR(%i THE USE OF CWCEPTION-ASSISTING TECHNOLOGIES
Undergoing any medical treatment carries some risk. With 
this in mind, feminist analysts have provided an extensive 
detailing of the physical risks of conception-assisting 
technologies. In so doing they hope to inform infertile women of 
the dangers which could arise from undergoing conception- 
assisting procedures. Liberal feminist analysts feel that in 
order for women to exercise free and informed choice about using 
these interventions they must have all the information about the 
treatments, long- and short-term side-effects, and possible 
future complications. In contrast, radical feminists feel that 
with all this knowledge of risks, many infertile women will 
reject the technologies because the risks to themselves are 
beyond what is normal and acceptable for other medical 
treatments.
Fertility Drugs
For each IVF cycle, numerous intensive medical procedures 
are performed, starting with daily hormonal treatments to 
stimulate hyperovulation. Hyperovulation involves a woman's 
ovaries being chemically manipulated so they produce more than 
one egg per'cycle. The more eggs produced, the more that can be 
harvested, and the greater the opportunity to continue the cycle. 
The process is not risk free and must be closely monitored using
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ultrasound and frequent blood tests, often requiring a woman to 
go to the medical facility twice a day (Williams, 1989) .
Fertility drugs carry a number of side effects: hot
flushes, ovarian enlargement resulting in abdominal discomfort or 
pain, breast tenderness, dizziness, headache, nervousness, nausea 
or vomiting, fatigue, and visual disturbances, all of which range 
from mild to severe (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993; Williams, 1989). There is also a chance of a 
serious side effect, ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome which can 
cause the ovaries to rupture causing further infertility or even 
death (Spallone, 1989; Williams, 1989).
The risks do not end there; fertility drugs are also related 
to Icnown carcinogens, are associated with high rates of 
miscarriage, and the effects of their long term use are unknown 
(Spallone, 1989). This has been particularly troubling to 
feminist analysts who feel that fertility drugs have not been 
adequately tested before being used on women (Corea, 1985). 
Findings of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
do not alleviate feminist concerns. The Royal Commission found 
that fertility drugs were used in dosages that exceed recommended 
levels and some drugs were prescribed for uses unapproved in 
Canada. For example, Lupron a frequently prescribed drug used to 
induce ovulation has only been approved in Canada for the 
treatment of prostate cancer, yet it is being given to women to
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treat endometriosis, and is used in conjunction with IVF (Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993).
bfedical Invasiveness
If the egg follicles develop without side-effects which 
necessitate the cessation of treatment, the eggs are retrieved 
using one of two surgical interventions. The first, laparoscopy, 
involves putting a woman under general anaesthetic which carries 
its own risks. Small openings are then made in the abdomen from 
which a viewing instrument and aspirator are used to obtain the 
eggs (Spallone, 1989). The second technique, ultrasound needle 
aspiration, or Transvaginal Ultrasound Directed Oocyte Recovery 
(TUDOR), has the advantage of requiring only local anaesthesia to 
numb the vaginal walls, but it is extremely painful and involves 
other risks. There is the possibility of damage to the bladder 
and the uterus since a needle is put in the vagina, and through 
the bladder to pull out the mature eggs (Boston Women's Health 
Book Collective, 1992; Spallone, 1989).
Egg retrieval marks the end of the most dangerous part of 
IVF, but further medical intervention is necessary. Next, the 
eggs are mixed with sperm, and resulting embryos (if conception 
occurs in the petri dish after twenty-four hours) are inserted 
into the woman's uterus. If any embryos implant, the resulting 
pregnancy is closely monitored using ultrasound and
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amniocentesis. The birth is not permitted to occur vaginally; to 
avoid any alleged unknown risks, a caesarean section is routinely 
performed (Boston Women's Health Book Collective, 1992; Corea,
1985).
It is important to note that the procedure can go wrong at 
any time, and frequently does: not enough eggs mature to make the 
retrieval worthwhile; fertilization does not occur; embryo 
implantation fails; or pregnancy does not result, is ectopic, or 
ends in miscarriage (Williams, 1989) .
The high degree of body invasiveness, the constant 
monitoring and the side-effects from the fertility drugs and 
surgeries make IVF physically and emotionally taxing for most; 
the stress has been described by users as "unrelenting" 
(Williams, 1989). Other stresses from the treatment include: the 
emotional turbulence, ranging from hope to disappointment, felt 
by women undergoing treatment; the disruption of paid employment 
necessary for most because treatment is time consuming; strain on 
a woman's personal life; and the depersonalization that may 
result from the "painful and embarrassing invasions of their 
bodies" during the treatment process (Warren, 1988: 38).
Multiple Pregnancies
In the unlikely event that IVF is successful there is a high 
probability that a multiple birth will result (Klein, 1989). In
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the general population one percent of all deliveries are for 
multiple births, compared to thirty percent of all IVF deliveries 
(Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993).
Multiple births pose serious health risks for both mothers 
and children. There is a higher risk of problems during
pregnancy including anaemia, miscarriage, toxaemia, high blood 
pressure, kidney trouble, difficult delivery, and post-birth 
haemorrhage. Multiple births are usually performed using
caesarean section, a surgical procedure which carries its own 
risks. The babies born are more likely to be premature and 
therefore of lower birth weight, which may result in other long­
term difficulties. Multiple births are also much more stressful 
for the parents because all of the costs and demands of 
parenthood are increased (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993).
Risks to IVF Children
Feminists also assert that there are unknown risks to 
children born from IVF beyond those resulting from multiple 
pregnancies. As previously noted, babies conceived through IVF 
are more likely to be born premature and have lower birth 
weights. Also, some authors suggest that the infant mortality 
rate may be four times higher for IVF babies than babies 
conceived under normal circumstances (Raymond, 1991).
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Other long-term risks to children remain unknown, as the 
oldest IVF child (born in 1978) is just reaching adulthood 
(Overall, 1993). This leads feminist analysts to make important 
analogies between IVF and other medical "breakthroughs". Recent 
history is littered with often untested "advances" in 
reproductive medicine— the Daikon Shield lUD, thalidomide, and 
forceps, for example— which though ostensibly meant to help women 
and children, have often lead to great harm since side- and 
intergenerational effects may remain unknown for many years. DES 
(diethylstilbestrol), for example, is a synthetic estrogen that 
was given to pregnant women in North America and Britain from 
1940 to 1970 in the belief that it prevented miscarriages. It 
was discovered in 1971 that many women whose mothers took DES 
developed clear-cell vaginal cancer, had higher rates of breast 
cancer, and had abnormalities of the reproductive organs which 
cause infertility (Dutton, 1988) . The effects of DES did not 
appear for close to twenty years after the drug was administered. 
Feminists are justifiably skeptical about the safety of IVF when 
any long-term ill effects may not be visible for decades 
(Mayrand, 1981; Overall, 1993; Simand, 1989).
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THE RISKS TO ALL WŒ4EN: CŒiCEPTION-ASSISTING TECHNOLOGIES IN 
THEIR SOCIAL CONTEXT
While feminist analysts provide a detailed explanation of 
the risks of the conception-assisting technologies to individual 
women who undergo treatment, what best distinguishes their 
critique is their examination of the effects of these 
technologies in a broader social context. Technological 
developments do not exist in a vacuum— their development and use 
are influenced by, and reflective of, existing social 
relationships. Feminists assert that our society is a male- 
dominated system characterized by power, dominance, hierarchy and 
competition (Sydie, 1988). This system sees women's bodies as 
inadequate for the tasks of conception, pregnancy and childbirth, 
making medical and technological intervention necessary to "fix" 
women's bodies (Overall, 1987).
Many feminists believe technological intervention in 
reproduction promotes male-dominated institutions taking control 
of women's reproductive capabilities— women's sole and autonomous 
source of power (O'Brien, 1981; Tong, 1989). The technology 
would not be seen to be malevolent to women if we lived in an 
egalitarian society, but because the power to create and shape 
technology has been historically removed from women's influence, 
the social context of patriarchy means reproductive technology is 
unlikely to benefit women as a group (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines,
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1990; Corea, 1985). This perspective is supported by feminists' 
extensive detailing of the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies to women who use them, and the potential risks they 
hold for all women.
Therapy or Esqserimentation?
While the IVF procedure itself is fraught with many risks, 
some of which are inherent in many medical procedures (e.g., 
drugs and surgery) , when the technology is placed in the wider 
social context other risks also become apparent. The first, 
according to feminist analysts, is the lack of clinical trials 
for the procedure, leading critics to assert that IVF is still an 
experimental technology. According to feminist biologist Ruth 
Hubbard:
I see no way around the fact that every in vitro 
fertilization and implant, and every person who results 
from it, is an experiment and a different experiment: 
both the women who bear these babies and the babies-on- 
into-adults themselves are guinea pigs (1981: 260).
Not much has happened since 1981 to alleviate these concerns. 
The findings of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies suggest that the current way IVF is being offered in 
Canada is unacceptable. Evidence suggests IVF is being used in 
situations which have not been found to be effective in helping 
women deliver healthy babies. According to the Royal Commission, 
IVF is only effective in cases of complete fallopian tube
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blockage, the original indication for the technique. While IVF
is used for other indications^, all other uses should be
considered experimental until their efficacy is demonstrated in
clinical trials
As IVF and related technologies have developed, they 
have sometimes been referred to as ' innovative 
therapy'... .A procedure is not 'therapy' unless it has 
been shown to be of demonstrable benefit; experimental 
treatments should not move from the realm of research 
to the realm of therapy unless and until effectiveness 
and risks have been identified (Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1993: 557).
While findings of the Royal Commission are not based solely 
on feminist critiques of new reproductive technologies, they do 
provide good, current evidence to support the claims of feminist 
analysts that IVF still remains, in many ways, an experimental 
procedure. Like similar government investigations in other 
countries, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
is becoming an essential source for Canadian feminist analysts, 
for current Canadian information, and as an indication of the 
path new reproductive technologies will likely take— a path which 
must be traced and analyzed to assess its potential impact on all 
women's lives.
 ̂ According to Spallone, other indications (generally at the physician's 
discretion) are suspiciously growing (1989) . IVF is often used when the woman 
has no infertility problems, but her partner has a low sperm count, in 
idiopathic (unexplained or natural) infertility, in cases where the tubes are 
only partially blocked, or where the woman has endometriosis (Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993).
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Success Rates
Feminists' assertion that IVF is experimental is based on 
more than the lack of clinical trials; the poor success rate of 
the technology also adds credence to this contention. Attempts 
to have children using IVF are usually unsuccessful. Success 
rates might not be at issue if the technology was neutral or
harmless, but IVF is not a benign technology and women undergo 
many risks when using IVF whether it is successful or not.
Objective success rates for IVF have been difficult to
ascertain. Success rates often range from five percent to as 
high as fifty percent with the variance in quoted success rates 
reflecting whose interests are being served by the data. Success 
rates are often constructed by practitioners through the use of 
statistics centring around successful implantations or chemical 
pregnancies, and there is a reluctance to disclose rates to the 
public at all (Boston Women's Health Collective, 1992; Burfoot,
1989; Raymond, 1991; Spallone, 1989).
A survey conducted as part of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies concurs with feminist analysts. 
Stephens and McLean (1993) found that ten to twenty percent of 
IVF attempts resulted in a live birth in 1992. IVF resulted in 
189 births in Canada in 1991, but there were approximately 2,900 
patients seeking treatment that same year. The survey also found
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the same lack of standard definitions of "success" making it 
impossible to calculate "true" success rates.
Distrust of Biomedicine
The risks of IVF multiply beyond the risks of the procedure 
itself, despite its wide international use, according to feminist 
analysts. To further delineate the risks of IVF and other 
conception-assisting technologies feminist analysts emphasize the 
connections between old and new reproductive technologies. 
Feminist theorists have a lengthy and profound distrust of the 
advances of biomedicine in light of the legacy of technological 
innovations which were ostensibly meant to help. Many of these 
advances— drugs like the aforementioned DES, and thalidomide, and 
inventions like forceps and lUDs— had the impact of further 
medicalizing women's bodies and reproduction, often causing 
iatrogenic illness (Corea, 1985; Culpepper, 1981; Dutton, 1988; 
Hubbard, 1981; Simand, 1989).
Conception-assisting technologies are being hailed as new 
cures for infertility when they are often attempts to resolve 
problems caused by older technologies (Holmes, 1981). For this 
reason, feminist analysts assert that conception-assisting 
technologies represent the pinnacle of medical exploitation of 
women; technology often causes their infertility, and then
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further experiments on their bodies are necessary with risky 
technologies to "cure" that infertility.
Feminist analysts have also shown that the term cure is a 
misnomer. Fertility drugs and IVF are a temporary, technological 
fix— not curing infertility, but merely bypassing the problem to 
help a woman bear a child (Burfoot, 1989; Crowe, 1985) . 
Infertile women must use the technology each time they wish to 
conceive, concretizing the increasing role medical intervention 
for conception, gestation and birth is having in women's lives.
Feminist analysts assert that if biomedicine really wanted 
to cure infertility it would put more resources into the less 
professionally and financially rewarding arena of prevention of 
infertility, much of which is iatrogenic in origin, or caused by 
sexually transmitted diseases (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines, 1990; 
Warren, 1988) . They also argue that the largest cause of 
infertility in the world, the mass sterilization of women in 
developing countries, is wholly preventable (Raymond, 1991). 
Feminists contend that if biomedical practitioners were truly 
concerned with the plight of infertile women, they would avoid 
medicalizing women's reproductive lives. This would allow women 
to exercise their reproductive autonomy, without being reliant 
solely on biomedicine.
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Pronatallst Ideology
Considering what we know about IVF, it is difficult to
comprehend why women would participate in the process. However,
this must be balanced against the tremendous social pressure for
women to reproduce:
Women frequently believe they must have children to be 
'real' and 'full' women because they are not valued as 
autonomous human beings, but only as servicers to men, 
primarily as wives and mothers (Hanmer, 1984: 445).
Women in our society are socialized to believe their true 
fulfillment and value comes from being mothers- Being infertile 
makes this socially-valued norm impossible to achieve, unless one 
tries conception-assisting technologies— the choice is to take 
the risks of using the technology, or risk the stigma attached to 
childlessness (Crowe, 1985). Historically, the duties of 
mothering have been used as justification for limiting women's 
public sphere opportunities, therefore, feminist analysts are 
very apprehensive about the development and promotion of 
technologies which reinforce this as women's primary role 
(Strickler, 1992).
Our social and economic structures are currently constructed 
to favour motherhood within the patriarchal family. The lack of 
good abortion services and the limited range of contraceptives, 
divorce laws which leave many women living in poverty, and poor 
employment opportunities for women, reinforce our societal belief
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that motherhood, in the context of the male-headed family, is 
women's best and natural social role. While most women in the 
1990s have children and work outside the home, the lack of day­
care facilities and beliefs of some that working mothers are 
unreliable, again reinforce this ideology of motherhood as 
women's primary occupation (McDaniel, 1993). Women's individual 
choices are shaped by these social and economic factors. While 
women may not consciously recognize or consider these social and 
economic factors, their development from childhood has been 
influenced by such ideological constructions, and they shape 
women's individual choices. For a woman who wants to have 
children, the discovery of infertility can be devastating.
Consec[uently, the use of conception-assisting technologies 
does nothing to address the underlying social impact of 
infertility and why it represents a crisis for many women who 
experience it. The use of conception-assisting technologies, 
both reflects and reinforces the patriarchal belief that women's 
primary role is motherhood. The risk for feminists is that 
conception-assisting technologies do not allow for the option of 
being childless and therefore hinder their efforts to expand the 
choices women have for self-determination (Sandelowski, 1991). 
Instead of making societal change towards alternative forms of 
parenting which allow infertile women to experience the social 
aspects of mothering, and providing other choices which expand
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acceptable roles for women, technology is created that reinforces 
the notion that mothering is women's natural role.
The technology of IVF also reinforces the social message 
that women are only fulfilled through the birth of genetically- 
related children. The preoccupation with having genetically- 
related children is equated by feminists with the devaluing of 
the social aspects of parenting: the life of the child after
she/he is born. Adoption becomes the last resort, meaning 
children are not appreciated for their own sake, but as 
possessions of their biological parents (Crowe, 1985; Overall, 
1987). The desire for genetically-related children may lead some 
women to take unnecessary risks and use IVF in cases where, for 
example, a partner is infertile, and therefore donor insemination 
would be much safer.
According to feminist analysts, conception-assisting 
technologies by their very existence increase the pressure on 
infertile women to keep trying to have a biologically related 
child until they have exhausted every available means. This in 
turn strengthens the pronatalist ideology and thereby increases 
the stigma and suffering infertile women endure (Warren, 1988) . 
Infertile women have not tried hard enough, unless they have 
tried everything, regardless of the personal costs to health and 
emotional state which they may endure in the process.
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Deciding Who is Fit to Reproduce
The social control of women promoted by the pronatalist and 
patriarchal notion of the "proper" role for women is further 
entrenched when one looks at who uses IVF services. In most
countries (even many with socialized medicine) conception- 
assisting technologies (especially IVF) are paid for by the 
couple. With treatments being priced at approximately five
thousand dollars per cycle for IVF, and with some insurance plans
not covering fertility drug prescriptions, the services will be 
primarily utilized by middle and upper income couples (Holmes, 
1991; Raymond, 1991; Stephens & McLean, 1993). Also, the 
enormous physical demands on women who undergo IVF make pursuing 
or continuing paid employment difficult, so generally, only those 
couples who can afford to live on one income are able to utilize 
the technology (Crowe, 1985; Williams, 1989) .
In the case of IVF, those who administer the service have 
tremendous control over which infertile women are allowed access. 
Generally IVF is only available for heterosexual couples— the 
classic patriarchal family (Corea, 1985; Raymond, 1984). The
medical establishment furthers its control of women, by 
unguestioningly maintaining the idea of woman as mother, and by 
defining who, is fit and unfit for that role. The nature of the 
technology itself, and the ideological values of its providers 
take control of reproduction away from the couple, and secure it
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in the medical realm. Conception-assisting technologies, 
according to feminists, are not operated with the best interests 
of women in mind, but for those who will gain financially and 
benefit from maintaining the heterosexual, patriarchal family 
structure: physicians, and the pharmaceutical and technological 
industries— generally upper-class white men (Corea, 1991).
RESPCWDING TO THE RISKS
While feminist analysts are in agreement about the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies as detailed above, there has 
been considerable disagreement among them about other possible 
dangers. All feminist analysts believe that the current use of 
conception-assisting technologies carries a number of risks which 
are not in women's best interests, but they diverge in 
discussions of the extent of these dangers, and in how to deal 
with them to ensure women's reproductive freedom and general 
safety and autonomy. The following will detail both radical 
feminist views that call for an outright ban on the use of 
conception-assisting technologies, and liberal feminist ideas for 
reforming the • use of conception-assisting technologies to make 
them more woman-centred to lessen the risks they hold for 
individual women.
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Ban the Technology
Radical feminist analysts maintain that the development and 
use of conception-assisting technologies are not in the best 
interests of women as a group, and should be banned. On top of 
the risks already mentioned, radical feminists detail what could 
result from the use of IVF, and related new reproductive 
technologies to further their claim. IVF is predicated on the 
removal of ova from women's bodies and the creation of embryos 
outside the womb; resulting embryos are therefore available for 
experimentation. This experimentation could lead to
technological developments which could be devastating to women, 
and to all of humanity.
Embryos are already being screened for their sex and some 
other genetic traits, and experiments are being performed which 
could allow genetic manipulation to correct certain diseases and 
disabilities before the embryo is implanted in a woman's uterus 
(Raymond, 1991). Advocates of a ban worry that "quality control" 
will become mandatory for all women who conceive to ensure that 
"imperfect" babies are not born. This would have profound 
negative effects on the already poor status of people with 
disabilities, and for the women who bear these children, as they 
could be blamed for not using the technology to avoid these 
"problems" (Corea, 1985).
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The desire to exercise "quality control" is already 
occurring in the contracting of surrogate mothers. If the 
surrogate is to be the biological mother of the child, she 
undergoes intense screening to ensure her biological fitness, 
with some couples choosing surrogates based on characteristics 
like eye and hair colour, and IQ. A surrogate's life is very 
regulated during the pregnancy and she must undergo genetic 
testing using amniocentesis, often being forced to have an 
abortion if some genetic defect is found. Many surrogacy
contracts also state that the surrogate will not be paid if she 
has an abortion (even though she is compelled to by her contract) 
or miscarriage, if the child is born with "defects" or is 
stillborn (Corea, 1985).
Radical feminist critics also fear the possible development 
of new technologies, especially ectogenesis, or the gestation of 
fetuses in artificial wombs. As a substantiation of their 
concerns, they cite writings by male scientists who argue for 
ectogenesis on the basis that it would protect fetuses from the 
"hostility" of the uterine environment and birth; from the 
increasingly poor physical environment marked by industrial 
waste, pollution, and food additives, which is harmful for 
gestating fetuses; and from mothers who "abuse" their children 
through alcohol and drug use, poor nutrition and smoking (Corea, 
1985, Overall, 1987). These feminist theorists contend that
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ectogenesis would be the ultimate manifestation of male control 
over reproduction leading to the elimination of women altogether.
Radical feminist analysts advocating full scale resistance 
to reproductive technologies also assert that the historical 
precedent of men attempting to control nature and women's bodies 
could lead to profound manipulations of human genetic material in 
the form of cloning and anima 1 -human hybrids, and result in 
devastating effects on our biological structures, the natural 
environment and the social organization of humanity (Corea, 1985; 
Overall, 1987; Tuana, 1989). They believe that male scientists 
and physicians are motivated to develop these procedures because 
of their own inability to have children. Through the 
technologies they can extend their role in reproduction, ensure 
that children are genetically "theirs", and maintain their power 
over women (Sandelowski, 1991; Warren, 1988).
However, radical feminists also see the potential for 
intensive control over women with the present range of 
reproductive technologies. The ability to remove ova from 
women's bodies means they can be put into the wombs of poor 
women, so that rich and powerful women do not have to undergo the 
discomforts or inconveniences of pregnancy and childbirth. 
Scientists are also trying to devise ways to retrieve eggs from 
dead women ÿ and from aborted female fetuses to make them 
available for women without functioning ovaries. Some feminists 
fear that women's reproductive capabilities could be controlled
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in ways similar to animal husbandry through the creation of 
"reproductive brothels" where some women are forced to produce 
eggs for other women whose wombs would be used to gestate babies 
for men (Corea, 1985).
Radical feminists, in calling for a ban on reproductive 
technologies not only oppose the physical, psychological and 
social risks to women from the procedures themselves, but also 
the potential uses to which these technologies could be put. 
They see the overwhelmingly male-controlled biomedical and 
scientific institutions developing technological interventions 
which crystallize women's primary role as mothers, and increase 
male control over reproduction, creating risks for the women who 
undergo the procedures and for all women. To the critics, these 
risks are unacceptable; they jeopardize the gains women have made 
for reproductive autonomy and must be resisted for the sake of 
all women.
What about the concerns of infertile women? Where do their
desires to have children fit into this analysis? Gena Corea, a
radical feminist who supports a ban on conception-assisting
technologies writes:
The suffering infertility causes women is enormous and 
deserves to be treated seriously. I do not think that 
those who respond to the suffering by offering to 
probe,  ̂scan, puncture, suction and cut women in 
repeated experiments are taking that suffering more 
seriously than I. They are not asking how much of 
women's suffering has been socially structured and 
inflicted and is therefore not inevitable (1985: 6) .
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Feminists like Corea assert that infertile women's reproductive 
choices are conditioned by the patriarchal, pronatalist social 
structure which these technologies help to further entrench. 
Their desire for children is socially constructed, not 
biologically necessary, and therefore can be overcome through 
methods other than these dangerous technologies (Corea, 1985; 
Hanmer, 1984; Klein, 1989; Raymond, 1984).
Because women's only socially acceptable status is to be 
gained through childbearing and child rearing, many will accept 
the physical and mental risks of treatment. Radical feminists 
contend that these women are being duped by patriarchal values 
and institutions to make choices which could cause great 
detriment to their well-being (Denny, 1994). Feminist analysts 
who wish to ban conception-assisting technology do not want to 
leave infertile women without any recourse. They prefer to work 
toward social change that would raise the consciousness of women 
and enable other alternatives— the acceptance of child free 
living, alternative forms of family and social structure which 
would allow for non-parents to nurture children, and a valuing of 
women for themselves and their abilities beyond mothering 
(Hubbard, 1981; Klein, 1989) .
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Questions and Alternatives
Liberal feminist analysts are questioning the position of 
radical feminists who wish to prohibit the use of conception- 
assisting technologies. Many contend that a new analysis of 
women's relationship to reproductive technologies must be 
undertaken (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines, 1990; Overall, 1993; 
Sawicki, 1991; Warren, 1988). These feminists agree that 
conception-assisting technologies like IVF carry many risks for 
individual women and for women as a group, but they also assert 
that the technologies will not be abandoned because there is too 
much at stake both politically and financially (Poff, 1989; 
Sawicki, 1991).
Even if it was possible to ban these techniques, they 
question whether it is necessary. Infertile women who have used 
conception-assisting technologies have not called for halting 
their use, and infertile women seeking treatment are welcoming 
the development of anything which could help them conceive (Koch,
1990) . If the very women who are directly affected by the 
technologies welcome them, then feminists who advocate 
prohibition might be seen as equally patronizing— imposing their 
own values and stifling the reproductive rights of infertile 
women (Denn^, 1994). Liberal feminist analysts assert that it is 
the bodies of infertile women which are at risk, and if they, 
after being properly informed of these risks, wish to use the
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technologies then their choices should be respected (Denny, 1994; 
Warren, 1988) . Simply advocating a ban on technology does not 
help women become informed about the risks and benefits, and 
therefore does not empower them to make sound choices— a main 
tenet of feminism (Sawicki, 1991) .
In advocating an individual's right to choose, liberal 
feminist analysts recognize that women's desires to have children 
are socially constructed. However, they assert that this does 
not mean infertile women seeking treatment are suffering from a 
'patriarchal false consciousness'. Infertile women's desires, 
they contend, are not "...faulty versions of the theoretician's 
categories" (Stanley & Wise, 1990: 24). Understanding where the 
desire to have children originates does not remove the desire, 
nor does it make it less real (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines, 1990; 
Koch, 1990; Overall, 1993; Warren, 1988).
Liberal ' feminists also state that even armed with 
information about risks and alternatives, women do not 
necessarily change their choices— they do not always become, 
"self-emancipating" (Denny, 1994: 63). They contend that
analyses by radical feminists who wish to ban conception- 
assisting technologies do not allow women to exercise choices 
about their reproductive lives. Rather, they reflect a 
paternalistic approach of protecting women from their own 
desires, ignoring their lived experiences: "Women are portrayed 
either as innocent and ignorant victims of the medical
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establishment or as inviting colluders in a horrifying extension 
of patriarchal control over women's bodies" (Sawicki, 1991: 72).
Liberal feminists also disagree with the "slippery slope" 
arguments of radical feminists who call for a ban on the 
technologies. They feel that radical feminist analysts who have 
presented frightening future scenarios have not provided 
convincing arguments as to why men would want such things as 
cloning and animal-human hybrids (Denny, 1994). Liberal 
feminists also point to the high cost of these techniques. They 
assert that ectogenesis would also be unlikely because there is 
no reason to invent new wombs, when control over women's wombs is 
far less expensive, and less technically sophisticated—  
technology is not necessarily needed to control women (Birke, 
Himmelweit & Vines, 1990; Warren, 1988) . The pronouncements of 
some feminists about a possible "Brave New World"* scenario also 
assume that the course of reproductive technologies will 
inevitably lead down the slippery slope of increased male power 
and control. This analysis is a form of technological 
determinism itself, and assumes that women (and many men) will 
not resist these developments (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines, 1990; 
Denny, 1994; Warren, 1988).
* Brave New World written by Aldous Huxley in 1932 is a dystopian novel about 
a society dominated by technology where babies are created ex vivo (outside 
the body) and gestated in bottles.
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Jana Sawicki, a post-modernist/post-structuralist feminist, 
asserts that there are "multiple centers of resistance" engaged 
in better determining the current form of new reproductive 
technologies (1991: 187). In her book Disciplining Foucault
(1991), she is critical of the perspective of radical feminists 
like Corea who have ignored efforts already underway to reshape 
the provision of new reproductive technologies. In their focus 
on dominant groups (especially biomedicine) radical feminists 
ignore the resistance and struggle already taking place. Sawicki 
states that feminists and other critics have and do play a role 
in the development and use of new reproductive technologies. She 
points to changes to the medical control and definition of 
pregnancy and childbirth resulting from challenges by the women's 
health movement as examples of resistance which have led to the 
redefinition of medical practices concerning women. These 
successes show that medical control over women and childbirth is 
not absolute and is constantly being challenged (Sawicki, 1991) .
Wholesale rejection of conception-assisting technologies and 
other new reproductive technologies does not identify what 
feminists should do to organize around and possibly against these 
technologies (Birke, Himmelweit & Vines, 1990). There are, 
however, many liberal feminist analysts who are fighting for 
better social policies and participation by women in the policy­
making process. Rejection of conception-assisting technologies 
is also a rejection of the potentially liberating aspects of
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these developments. Technologies which help women conceive can 
be used to expand the definitions of family and motherhood. For 
example, lesbians and single women, by demanding access to these 
technologies, are challenging societal norms about the 
definitions of family and motherhood. Also, not all reproductive 
technologies are harmful for women. Most feminists extol the 
benefits of other reproductive technologies like contraceptives 
which have given women greater autonomy. Clearly there are 
things to be gained from technological developments if feminists 
participate in their development and implementation, and continue 
to identify and resist dangerous medical procedures (Sawicki,
1991).
Numerous ethical and policy frameworks have been initiated 
by liberal feminists to help direct the path reproductive 
technologies take. They contend that if technologies like IVF 
have to exist, there is a form they should take in order to 
represent the best interests of women (Eichler, 1989; Holmes, 
1981; Poff, 1989; Sherwin, 1989). The caring, woman-centered 
approach to infertility treatment that liberal feminist analysts 
advocate incorporates the following principles:
• At the macro-level steps need to be taken to ensure greater 
participation of women in all areas of medicine and biomedical 
research. • Women are also needed on government and other 
bodies which regulate the technologies. This may help to
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break the male hegemony of biomedicine, and may lead to 
better, woman-centered solutions to the problem of infertility 
(Warren, 1988).
• For women undergoing treatment, truly informed choice and 
consent are essential. Counseling should be provided (outside 
the treatment context and by an impartial third party) to give 
full information about the treatment, and alternatives like 
adoption and child-free living (Holmes, 1981; Overall, 1993) .
• Treatment must be provided on a fair and equal basis. This 
means there cannot be discrimination based on marital status, 
sexual orientation, geographic location or ability to pay, or 
any other criteria besides medical fitness (Holmes, 1981; 
Overall, 1993; Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993).
• There must be adequate record keeping, follow-up and research. 
Techniques that are experimental must be used in the context 
of clinical trials, and all patients, and resulting children, 
must be monitored for long-term side effects (Overall, 1993; 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993) .
• Support systems must be available for all participants to help 
them through the entire infertility treatment process. This 
support wçuld not only help them continue treatment, but also 
would ensure that women are active participants in their
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treatment; asking questions, re-evaluating their goals, and 
making sound treatment decisions (Overall, 1993).
CONCLUSION
Feminist analysts assert that true liberation for women will 
only occur when we have absolute control over our bodies. The 
notion of choice necessarily assumes that there is a balance of 
power and a freedom from coercion. The question facing feminist 
analysts who address the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies is how choices are made by infertile women. What 
are the constraints, shaped by male control and patriarchal 
agendas, on infertile women's informed choice? And, are 
conception-assisting technologies liberating for infertile women, 
or do they, in the context of our sexist society, further enslave 
women to the role of childbearer and childrearer?
Most feminist analysts agree on the risks which conception- 
assisting technologies like I VF hold for the women who use them. 
They agree that the techniques are still untested, and that their 
long-term safety for women and any resulting children is 
unproven. They recognize that the provision of conception- 
assisting technologies is financially, physically and emotionally 
costly for women, and that many are denied access by biomedical 
clinicians who act as social gate-keepers, deciding who is most 
fit to reproduce. Most feminist analysts also concur that
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conception-assisting technologies medicalize infertility, 
devising heroic, invasive procedures instead of preventing many 
of the causes of infertility before they occur. They see that 
these technologies entrench the ideology that woman's primary 
role is mothering genetically-related children in the context of 
the nuclear family.
The split between feminist analysts is their response to 
these risks. Here the differing social and political practices 
which reflect their views on what is needed to secure the 
liberation of women becomes apparent. Radical feminists assert 
that conception-assisting technologies will allow for greater 
control of all women's reproductive capabilities. They assert 
that the collective interests of women as a group are harmed by 
the use of conception-assisting technologies, and that they 
should be banned to ensure the safety of women as an oppressed 
group. Conversely, liberal feminists while recognizing the 
physical, social and emotional risks of conception-assisting 
technologies, feel that these risks can be managed through a 
better, woman-centred approach to their use. They feel that 
women have the ability to shape the use of conception-assisting 
technologies in ways which will give individual infertile women 
greater reproductive autonomy.
An important criticism of both liberal and radical feminist 
perspectives is that very little of the analysis of conception- 
assisting technologies focuses on the women who use the
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technology. Feminist analyses do not examine how infertile women 
understand and assess the risks of using the technology, and in 
what instances they perceive the risks as worth taking. The next 
chapter will examine the conceptions of risk by infertile women 
seeking treatment to see if they correspond with feminist 
assessments of the risks, and how their social and political 
views influence their risk constructions, and decision-making 
process about using conception-assisting technologies.
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Chapter Four 
Infertile Women's Conceptions of Risk
It may be difficult to understand why women would use 
conception-assisting technologies like IVF and fertility drugs, 
knowing the risks that feminist critics detail. However, 
infertile women seeking treatment reject many of the arguments 
put forward by feminist analysts cibout the risks conception- 
assisting technologies hold for women's autonomy. Infertile 
women especially reject risk conceptions which label users as 
being dominated by patriarchy through their husbands and the 
biomedical establishment. In contrast, they assert they are 
quite able to make rational decisions about the management of 
their fertility (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993).
Writings by and about infertile women show that many are 
cognizant of the risks of the technologies themselves, yet they 
continue to use these procedures and even demand their expansion. 
One reason for their differing perspective on the technologies is 
their conceptualization of the risks. It is important to analyze 
conception-assisting technologies within the context of infertile 
women's lives as this makes their risk constructions more 
apparent (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). The experience of
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infertility, and the pressure and desire to conceive shape 
infertile women's constructions of risk surrounding the use of 
conception-assisting technology. Couples weigh the costs of 
technological intervention with the possible benefit of having a 
much desired child. For couples seeking treatment, the promise 
of a child makes most risks seem negligible.
This chapter details the risk constructions of infertile 
women seeking treatment. Using selective accounts of how other 
researchers summarize women's (and couples') conceptions of risk 
and conception-assisting technologies, typical experiences with 
infertility and motivations for parenthood will be detailed, to 
better understand infertile women's risk constructions. The 
decision-making route taken by couples will be analyzed to show 
the various constructions of risk that emerge throughout the 
infertility treatment process. This will include an exploration 
of infertile women's views of conception-assisting technology and 
medical treatment for fertility, to better understand how their 
conceptions of risk are constructed.^ The focus of this chapter 
is primarily the risk construction of infertile women seeking 
treatment, but an explanation of couples' risk construction is 
also essential. Most often the decision to pursue infertility 
treatment— like the decision to have children— is made by
’ It is inç)ortant to remember that the experiences and risk constructions 
detailed are those of infertile women seeking treatment. Their perceptions 
may be quite different from infertile women who do not use conception- 
assisting technologies.
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couples. Becker and Nachtigall (1994) found that because women 
had a greater involvement in medical treatment for infertility 
they made the final decision about what constituted risk, and 
what risks to. take. However, they do not examine the possible 
influences on a woman's decision making by her partner. Women 
may voice the final decision about pursuing treatment, but it is 
important to recognize that there may be subtle and not-so-subtle 
ways in which a partner may shape or significantly influence the 
decision which she ultimately voices.
EXPERIENCING INFERTILITY
Clinically, infertility is defined as the inability to 
conceive after one or two years of trying. Infertility usually 
remains undetected until a couple attempts to have a child. It 
is therefore a dysfunction located between bodies, and does not 
have to be cured for good health.® It is generally defined as an 
illness only by virtue of one symptom: the inability to have a 
child (Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis & Harris, 1990) . Infertility 
is also not solely a woman's ailment; male reproductive 
dysfunctions are the cause for almost half of all cases (Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993) . It is 
important to note that clinical definitions of infertility only
® Women with illnesses like diabetes or cancer may know they are infertile 
before they attempt conception since infertility is sometimes a result of 
their illness or treatment (i.e., menopause caused by chemotherapy).
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consider those who desire children, so social factors shape what 
is considered a medical problem. There may be couples who are 
infertile, but are unconcerned about their infertility. In this 
thesis discussions of infertility include only those couples who 
feel their "condition" is a problem, because it obstructs their 
ability to have children.
The clinical, scientific definitions understate the trauma 
of infertility for most women. It has been described as a 
devastating experience, interfering with almost all aspects of 
life (Strickler, 1992), and a chronic illness with the continuing 
reminder of loss and the continuing hope for a cure (Lasker & 
Borg, 1987). The experience of infertility is a profoundly 
difficult experience for many women. It involves a disruption in 
the personal normal course of life which challenges their 
assumptions about their own identities and abilities 
(Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis & Harris, 1990). It also has 
significant personal costs which may include lack of fulfillment 
and diminished quality of life, psychological distress, and 
conflict with family and friends (SPR Associates, 1993) .
Alison Solomon (1989) has likened attitudes toward 
infertility to those toward rape. Both crises are directly 
related to the status of women in a patriarchal society, and 
reactions to them are very similar: There is ignorance in the
general population about the crisis; there is a stigma attached 
to the victims; the feelings experienced (shock, denial, guilt.
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anger, depression) are similar; there are many stereotypes about 
the victims; and the reactions of women to the crisis situation 
are comparable (Solomon, 1989).
Most infertile women grow up with the presumption they are 
fertile, and that they will have a child with their partner 
(Lasker & Borg, 1987; Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis & Harris, 
1990). Discovering their inability to conceive, women feel shock 
and denial, followed by feelings of anger and failure since an 
important aspect of their lives is not within their control 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Eck Manning, 1984; Lasker & Borg, 
1987; Williams, 1988) . Infertile women may also feel guilt over 
past actions ' which they believe may be related to their 
infertility. They are suspicious that their use of
contraceptives caused damage to their bodies. Others feel they 
are being punished for past actions including elective abortions, 
sexual pleasure, masturbation, or a failed marriage (Sandelowski, 
Holditch-Davis & Harris, 1990).
Infertility also affects women's self-perception. Having 
children is considered a central aspect of women's lives, and 
this ideology permeates women's conceptions of themselves. The 
ability to have children is often viewed as synonymous with 
femininity itself (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Williams, 1988) . 
Many writing about the experiences of infertile women have found 
that the discovery of infertility negatively affected how women 
felt about themselves— it was not an element or part of the body
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which was faulty, rather, they perceived their entire being as 
"incapable", "abnormal" or "defective" (Sandelowski, Holditch- 
Davis & Harris, 1990; Whiteford & Gonzales, 1995). Feelings of 
guilt, and these negative self-perceptions, lead many women who 
are infertile to offer to leave their partners so they can find 
another woman to have children with (Crowe, 1985).
Where do these self perceptions originate? Infertile 
women's negative feelings partly arise because they cannot 
proceed with their lives as others in society do, by having 
children. They have internalized our social norms regarding 
reproduction. In North American society it is commonly believed 
that married couples should have children, and that they should 
want to have children. These societal norms are reinforced by 
"pro-birth" government policies, such as income tax deductions, 
which reward married couples who have children (Whiteford & 
Gonzales, 1995). Our society is strongly pronatalist despite 
declining birth rates over the last century. And this societal 
exalting of parenthood and the desire for children is not 
profoundly altered by sexual, ethnic, religious or social class 
divisions (Miall, 1994) .
Our pronatalism leads us to view with suspicion married 
couples who do not have children. Voluntarily childless couples 
are often viewed as immoral, selfish, unfulfilled, prone to 
divorce, or unhappily married (Miall, 1994). These
characterizations often follow those who are involuntarily
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childless as well since infertility is a "secret stigma", 
physically invisible and usually hidden from even close friends 
and relatives (Whiteford & Gonzales, 1995). Even when
infertility is known, couples are stigmatized; they are 
characterized as being sexually, psychologically and physically 
inferior, though these feelings are often mixed with sympathy 
(Miall, 1994). Infertile women are also often blamed for the 
couple's infertility; people assume it was caused by promiscuity, 
previous abortions or psychological problems. Women are blamed 
for putting off childbearing for too long, and putting their 
careers ahead of their most important role, motherhood (Inhorn, 
1994; Solomon, 1989).
Experiences of infertility and social stigmatization may 
change a couple's relationship with family and friends. Women 
often feel excluded from their friends who have children since 
parenting is a common experience around which friendships are 
developed and maintained (Crowe, 1985). Friends and family often 
do not understand the difficulty of infertility and misunderstand 
its origins. Their attempts to provide social support in 
response may further the couple's sense of stigmatization (Miall, 
1994) . Their solutions to the problem of infertility are usually 
considered unsupportive; they give useless advice ("relax"), 
religious pronouncements ("it is God's will"), and continue to 
put tremendous pressure on the couple to have a baby (Koch,
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1989). Couples often become isolated and lonely, since being 
around those with children is too painful (Lasker & Borg, 1987).
PARENTHOOD MOTIVATIONS OF INFERTILE COUPLES
It is important to remember that the desires of the 
infertile are not very different from most other Canadian 
couples. A study by Linda Williams (1988) found that the 
parenthood motivations of infertile couples seeking treatment are 
similar to all couples who want children: (1) they feel it is
part of marriage— something that couples do; (2) there are 
pleasures and advantages to having children; (3) they want to see 
a child grow and contribute to his or her development; (4) they 
want to love and nurture a child; and (5) there is a wish to 
recreate themselves, and leave a legacy of their existence in the 
future (Williams, 1988).
A fundamental question remains, however: If infertile
couples want to have all of the experiences of raising children, 
why not adopt? There are very few domestically born, white® 
infants available through either public or private adoption 
mechanisms in Western countries including Canada, and these are 
generally the children which infertile couples desire. There are 
also many restrictions on adoption related to a couple's age.
® The experiences of white couples dominate the literature on infertility. 
This may be because they are more likely to have financial resources to 
utilize conception-assisting technologies and pay the high costs of private 
adoptions.
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their assumed parenting ability, their financial position and in 
some cases, whether they have tried everything possible to have 
their own children (Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1991).
There is, however, another reason why couples do not choose 
adoption; lilce couples who conceive easily, many desire 
biologically-related children. Infertile couples value a genetic 
link with their children. For men, genetically-related children 
are often seen as proof of their virility, and they may define 
"fatherhood" by their role in conception, or their genetic 
paternity (Crowe, 1985; Lasker & Borg, 1987) . For women, 
genetically-related children are also important. Many women feel 
that they must "give" their husband a biological heir, or that 
biological motherhood is an essential aspect of fertility. Some 
women also value the experiences of pregnancy, birth and breast­
feeding— things which adoption cannot provide (Williams, 1988).
For many couples adoption just does not carry with it the 
same benefits as having genetically-related children. Having a 
child is not enough; infertile couples endure the strains of 
conception-assisting technologies not only to have a child, but 
also for all of the benefits of genetically-related children 
(Strickler, 1992) . Adoption does not become an option for most 
infertile couples until all of the possible biomedical routes 
using conception-assisting technologies fail. Many couples 
choose not to adopt because of strong objections to adoption
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centring around the concept of raising children that are not 
genetically their own (Williams, 1988). Many couples believe 
that adoption is risky because they cannot be sure of the "kind" 
of child they will get. Using biologically deterministic 
arguments, some couples feel they may receive a child who may be 
in some way deviant, unintelligent or too much unlike themselves 
(Lasker & Borg, 1987). Couples who are against adoption 
sometimes believe they can be more sure of the future 
characteristics, both social and physical, of children 
genetically related to themselves.
WEIGHING THE RISKS OF INFERTILITY TREATMENT
Upon discovering they are infertile, Canadian couples are 
faced with two possible courses of action: they can either do
nothing and see what happens, or they can seek treatment. 
Decision making for infertile couples is a balancing act: they
must weigh the possibilities of action against those of inaction 
and calculate whether the costs of each route outweigh the 
benefits. Therefore, their constructions of risk surrounding 
conception-assisting technologies take into consideration both 
positive and negative outcomes of both options.
Upon diagnosis, infertile couples understand there is an 
almost one-hundred percent risk of remaining childless^® if they
10 Some couples have conceived many years after being told they will never 
have children.
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do not use conception-assisting technologies. This means they 
risk facing the stigmatization attached to infertility, the lack 
of resolution of their infertility problems, and possible regret 
in the future (Menning, 1981) . For many infertile couples these 
are risks they are not willing to take, because their desire for 
a child is so strong, as is their faith in biomedicine and 
technology. There really is no decision to make— if they want to 
have a child, they have to undergo treatment.
Infertility treatment is like a high-stakes gamble: the
risks of treatment are high, but so is the potential reward. A 
couple can only "win" if they use conception-assisting 
technologies. It also means that one must ignore the success 
rates because the goal is to defy the odds. Conception-assisting 
technologies are like lottery tickets, one has to play the game 
in order to win (Koch, 1990; Lasker & Borg, 1987). For infertile 
couples, the potential rewards are worth the risk.
CHOOSING CONCEPTION-ASSISTING TECHNOLOGY: THE MEDICALIZATION OF 
INFERTILITY
Infertile couples who seek treatment feel very strongly that 
infertility is a medical problem, therefore they look to the 
biomedical establishment and its technological interventions for 
answers. In so doing they take the culturally-prescribed route 
of seeking biomedical solutions to their infertility problems.
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Pursuing medical treatment for ailments is considered socially 
responsible behaviour, and is reflected in the individualistic 
ideology of North American society which prizes taking active, 
personal control in problem solving.
Infertility disrupts couples' plans for personal success, 
and they feel that their suffering, which is not adequately
addressed in society and through the medical system (i.e., not
covered by Canadian Medicare) abrogates their "right" to 
reproduce (Strickler, 1992). Many infertile women feel that
conception-assisting technologies are a human right which should 
be available to all who need them, with some advocates asserting 
that infertile couples are "owed" access to reproductive 
technologies because infertility often has iatrogenic origins 
(Koch, 1990; Menning, 1981; Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1992). They view conception-assisting
technologies, and especially IVF, as their last hope to have
genetically-related children. To infertile couples, the
controversies surrounding new reproductive technologies are 
irrelevant and insensitive to their needs, and they are against 
any ban or moratorium which would impede their access to the 
technologies (Lasker & Borg, 1987; Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1992). In fact, they are so focused 
on using conception-assisting technologies that, for example, it 
has proven difficult to find couples willing to participate as a
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control group in clinical trials to determine IVF's efficacy 
(Collins, Burrow & Willan, 1993).
Once infertility is medically designated as a disease, 
couples (now patients) pursue a "cure" only through biomedical 
means (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). The knowledge of infertility, 
while suspected by many couples, must be confirmed by biomedicine 
before it becomes a reality— a couple's true state of being 
(Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis & Harris, 1990). The medicalization 
of infertility means that options like child-free living and 
adoption disappear, because the narrow focus on infertility as a 
disease state limits the types of solutions possible.
Infertile couples have high expectations of the biomedical 
establishment and its technological interventions. Couples 
believe strongly that biomedicine has the ability to "cure" their 
infertility (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991). Several studies of 
infertile couples' expectations from treatment state that most, 
if not all, couples feel confident that the treatment will work 
for them and that they will have a successful pregnancy (Koch, 
1989; Lasker & Borg, 1987; SPR Associates, 1993; Stewart & 
Glazer, 1986). This, however, runs counter to the actual success 
rates of conception-assisting technologies— only about half of 
all couples who seek treatment will be successful, and the 
success rate for techniques like IVF is only about ten percent 
(Eck Menning, 1984).
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CŒTCEPTIWS OF RISK
At the outset, treatment using conception-assisting 
technologies holds little risk in the minds of infertile women 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1991). As treatment progresses, risks 
become more apparent and important, invariably because the 
invasiveness of the treatment becomes more obvious once one is 
experiencing it. The Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies (1993) found that many women expressed concern about 
health risks, wishing they knew more about long- and short-term 
effects. Some were afraid to ask questions fearing they would be 
viewed as trouble-makers and be asked to leave the treatment 
program (Stuart, 1989). With long waiting lists, those with 
access to conception-assisting technologies, especially IVF, feel 
they are in a privileged position and do not want to do anything 
to jeopardize their treatment.
Other sources confirm the Royal Commission's findings; 
ultimately, regardless of their fears, most couples felt the 
risks of the treatments were secondary to the possibility of 
having a child. For many women, no risk was too great, and they 
would continue as long as they could with treatments to achieve 
their goal (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Koch, 1990; Lasker & Borg, 
1987; Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1992). 
There are many stories in the literature of women enduring 
incredible side-effects or having near-fatal complications from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 5
treatment, and yet continuing with treatments using conception-
assisting technologies because their desire for a child was so
strong (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Koch, 1990; Williams, 1988).
For these women, the ethic: "You are never a failure until
you stop trying" prevails. The risk of giving up is not an
option, their desires to have children are too great (Kozolanka,
1989). Not using biomedical interventions has the potential to
lead to regret later in life, with some women fearing they have
not tried everything possible to have a child (Becker &
Nachtigall, 1994; Crowe, 1985; Sandelowski, 1991). Fearing the
later regret of making a wrong choice now, many women continue to
use medical technology.
You cannot say no to IVF. It's a question of
responsibility to one's own conscience. I think I
would blame myself for the rest of my life if I said no 
to this last cycle because it might result in a child 
(quoted in Koch, 1990: 109) .
For most women not using conception-assisting technologies, not 
trying, or even not trying hard enough, is equated with failure.
This also helps to explain why true success rates are often 
ignored by many women. If infertile women believe treatment is 
not going to work they will find the physical and emotional 
strains they had to endure unbearable. Koch (1990) believes 
women use subjective, "magical" beliefs like being particularly 
suited to techniques, or invoking luck, to help them 
psychologically cope with continuing treatment. Infertile women 
are motivated by the possible end goal; the benefits of having a
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child will surely outweigh the extreme costs involved in 
treatment (Williams, 1988).
From this description it may sound as though all infertile 
women fanatically endure incredible strains, and try anything and 
everything to attempt conception. This may be the case for some 
women, but many stop treatment earlier. Treatment for
infertility is a process, not a discrete medical procedure and 
women, generally in consultation with their husbands, are 
constantly weighing the risks of these treatments. Most women 
are initially treated with mild fertility drugs, increasing to 
more intensive ones if they do not conceive, and if still 
unsuccessful, they may decide to try IVF. At the initiation of 
each new treatment couples must go through the risk-weighing 
decision-making process, balancing the pros and cons (see Figure 
One) . For each woman there is a point at which the risks become 
too great for treatment to continue.
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Many factors part of, and external to, the treatment of infertility may result in couples going 
through some or all of this decision-making process many times.
The point at which women decide to discontinue treatment is 
shaped by many factors. These include: (1) the amount of money
they have to spend on treatments; (2) the wishes of their 
husbands who may be fearful that treatment may affect their 
health; (3) the physical and emotional strain of the treatments;
(4) experiences with physicians and staff conducting treatments;
(5) the experience of dangerous side-effects from treatments 
(e.g., hyperstimulation syndrome); (6) being offered a child for
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adoption; or (7) being told there are no further medical actions 
that can be taken (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Williams, 1988) . 
These factors will shape what women consider as doing everything 
to attempt to conceive. Some women try all available treatments 
feeling the risks are worth it, while others stop after taking 
one drug, or after one cycle of IVF. For those who do not try 
everything, there may be some resentment, or the inability to 
accept their childlessness, especially if external factors like 
finances, or the unwillingness of their husbands to continue 
force them to stop treatment before they are ready.
Other Benefits of Treatment
Women who do not have a child with the help of conception- 
assisting technologies often report that they do not regret the 
treatment experience. Aspects of the technologies themselves 
provide infertile women benefits outside of their supreme goal of 
having a child. Most women are satisfied with their treatment 
experience, and have very few regrets, though some wished they 
had sought treatment sooner and others wished they had tried to 
adopt earlier, in both cases to increase their likelihood of 
having a child (Lasker & Borg, 1987; Strickler, 1992).
Many women felt treating their infertility allowed them to 
gain control over what would otherwise have been an 
uncontrollable situation. Their bodies failed them, and by
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pursuing medical options they were able to take advantage of
existing opportunities instead of passively accepting their
situation (Strickler, 1992). Couples who try conception-
assisting technologies achieve a psychological reward, they can
now come to a resolution point— they know there is no possible 
way for them to have biological children. This means they can 
choose to try adoption, or try to live without children, and they 
know that they have fulfilled the socially acceptable state of 
doing everything they could (Koch, 1990; Williams, 1988).
For couples with unexplained infertility, seeking treatment 
using conception-assisting technologies also may help them find 
the cause of their ailment. In these cases, conception-assisting 
technologies not only hold the possibility of a child, they also 
serve as a diagnostic tool. For some women, finding out why they 
cannot conceive becomes almost as important as conceiving itself. 
Finding the cause of their infertility often leads women towards 
resolution of their infertility crisis (Williams, 1988).
CONCLUSION
In our society, most people believe that having children is 
an essential part of being an adult and of marriage. This is 
especially true for women, for whom mothering is thought to be a 
central role. Discovering infertility is therefore devastating 
for many women. Infertility represents a crisis which profoundly
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disrupts women's conceptions of themselves and their abilities. 
They experience a wide range of emotions including: shock,
denial, anger, guilt, depression and grief, and they feel their 
bodies have betrayed them. People who are involuntarily 
childless are also treated differently by family and friends.
They are often blamed for their problems, and stigmatized. This, 
coupled with the strain of being around those with children, 
makes the experience of infertility one often undergone in
isolation.
For infertile couples who wish to have children, the roots 
of their desires are essentially similar to those who have no 
trouble conceiving. They feel that they have much to give
children, and would like to benefit from that relationship by 
creating a legacy. They also feel that having children is
essential for moving from being merely a couple to becoming a 
family. Infertile couples are similar to couples with no 
fertility problems in that they desire genetically-related 
children. Our society values a genetic link between parents and 
children; it is equated with virility in men and femininity in 
women. For women, the experiences of pregnancy, birth and 
breast-feeding also fuel the desire for a genetically-related 
child. There is also a belief that adopted children are a risk 
because one cannot be sure of their genetic makeup and their 
future social and physical disposition. These cultural
constructs, and the scarcity of domestically born, white infants.
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makes adoption an option to be tried only after all attempts at 
conception have failed.
The decision to attempt infertility treatment using 
conception-assisting technologies involves weighing the costs and 
benefits of undergoing treatment, or doing nothing. Infertile 
couples therefore take into account both the negative and 
positive outcomes of all options. They must decide if the risks 
of not undergoing treatment, and possible feelings of regret and 
failure, outweigh the risks of the treatment itself. And, they 
must weigh the risks of treatment against the small likelihood of 
having a biologically-related child. It would appear that 
infertile women are very much aware of the physical, emotional 
and financial risks of treatment, but these concerns are 
generally overshadowed by their desire for a child. Infertile 
women, by deciding to use conception-assisting technologies are 
participating in a gamble. The price of trying may be high, but 
the possible reward is considered priceless.
By electing to utilize conception-assisting technologies, 
infertile women are participating in the medicalization of 
infertility. .In so doing they carry with them the strong belief 
that infertility is a medical problem and therefore requires 
medical solutions. Seeking "cures" through the biomedical 
establishment is culturally sanctioned behaviour. We prize 
taking active control over medical problems, especially those, 
like infertility, which have a social as well as a physical
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dimension. Infertile couples have high expectations of the 
biomedical establishment and believe they will beat the odds and 
have a child. ■
Infertile women who seek treatment are also often empowered 
by their experience. They are able to exercise control over what 
would otherwise be an uncontrollable situation, perceiving 
themselves as active agents in the decision-making process. For 
these women, choosing conception-assisting technologies may mean 
choosing risks, but it also means actively resisting the stigma 
of childlessness.
The cost of treatment means that not all infertile couples 
have access to conception-assisting technologies. In Canada, 
conception-assisting technologies like IVF and fertility drugs 
are not covered by Medicare. This means that those who do use 
conception-assisting technologies reflect an elite group in 
society (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). A study conducted for the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies found that the 
majority of couples pursuing treatment in Canada have annual 
incomes of over fifty thousand dollars, with both partners being 
employed full time. Nearly all the women in treatment were 
between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine. The majority of 
women also had some form of post-secondary education (SPR 
Associates, 1993).
The fact - that it is the woman who receives treatment in 
almost all cases, reflects another cultural construction: that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 3
women are responsible for all aspects of conception and 
contraception (Inhorn, 1994). This often means fertile women 
undergo procedures using conception-assisting technologies for 
their male partners "...on behalf of a fertile marriage" 
(Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis, & Harris, 1990: 198) . Medically it 
is not the woman who has a problem, so infertility often is seen 
as a problem of couples, not individuals (Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1993). But, while infertility is a 
disease of the couple, it is women and women's bodies which 
remain the dominant site of intervention. Women generally make 
the final decision about using conception-assisting technologies, 
what constitutes risk, and what risks are worth taking to have a 
child (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). But, their decisions are 
likely to be shaped by many influences, especially the desires of 
their partners.
Women generally feel that the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies are minimal at the beginning of treatment. This 
perception changes with time and experience with the treatments 
themselves. Many wish they knew more about the long- and short­
term side-ef fects, and are surprised at how emotionally- and 
physically-exhausting procedures are. Throughout the treatment 
process women continually re-evaluate the risks and balance the 
positive and negative aspects of their experiences, stopping 
treatment when the risks, in their opinion, become too high. For 
many, however, regardless of their state, and their fears, their
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overwhelming desire for a child overrules any thought of stopping 
treatment. Using conception-assisting technologies allows 
infertile women to exert control over their bodies, and allows 
them to try all the options they choose before accepting their 
childlessness. The technology holds out the potential for hope, 
and fearing later regret and "what ifs" women continue, until all 
options, finances, or they themselves are exhausted.
Characteristics of the IVF process may compel women to keep 
trying. For example, IVF moves all of the micro-processes 
contributing to conception (ovulation, fertilization, and 
implantation) into view, allowing women to chart "how far along" 
they are in each treatment cycle. Women therefore feel they are 
making progress in treatment with each stage they successfully 
complete. If a woman moves past egg retrieval to fertilization 
for example, she has moved "closer" to a pregnancy. The 
visibility of a usually invisible process psychologically pushes 
women into trying for higher levels of achievement, making it 
very difficult to stop trying (Sandelowski, 1991; Williams, 
1988) .
Women do stop trying though. They either have a child, or 
some eventually decide that using conception-assisting 
technologies will not help them have a child. Most women report 
being satisfied with their experience with conception-assisting 
technologies, and they feel that it was worth the risks for even 
the possibility of having a child.
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The risk constructions of infertile women seeking treatment 
are extraordinary in the fact that they are so ordinary. They 
very much reflect the dominant ideologies of our society, the 
high value we place on married couples having children, the 
importance of motherhood, the stigma of infertility, and the 
central place given to biomedicine to resolve problems that are 
both physical and social in origin. Infertile women's
constructions of the risks of conception-assisting technologies 
are shaped by these social influences and demonstrate why to 
these women, almost any risk is worth taking to have a child.
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Chapter Five
BiomeciicaQ. Clinicians' Conceptions of Risk
Primum non nocere 
(Above all else do no harm)
(Ancient medical maxim)
As biomedicine is responsible for the development and use of 
conception-assisting technologies, constructions of risk employed 
by biomedical clinicians must also be explored. Biomedical 
clinicians control medical knowledge and technology. They also 
decide who is ill and who is not ill thereby controlling 
patients' access to treatment (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Lasker 
& Borg, 1987) . In so doing, they play an important role in 
structuring information for patients, and the treatment choices 
they make (Deber, Bouchard & Pendleton, 1993). Biomedical risk 
construction ultimately shapes lay risk constructions, in both 
positive and negative ways.
The power accorded biomedicine is socially defined. We have 
been socialized to believe that these methods of defining and 
treating illness are correct, and that physicians' judgments 
should be trusted (Lasker & Borg, 1987). As was demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, when faced with infertility, couples seek a 
solution through biomedical means because they have been 
socialized to identify infertility as an illness and believe
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biomedicine holds the solutions. This power did not always 
exist. Biomedical clinicians worked to gain exclusive control 
over the definition and treatment of illness at the beginning of 
this century by, among other things, discrediting other competing 
healers and paradigms (e.g., midwives and homeopaths), and 
through government legislation. Now their hegemony is maintained 
by a thoroughly medicalized society which often demands that 
biomedicine have an unlimited authority to define, diagnose and 
treat illness. The medicalization of infertility represents a 
recent example of this phenomenon.
With so much power over the diagnosis and treatment of 
infertility, it is essential that the risk construction of 
biomedical clinicians be detailed. To do so, the social context 
in which biomedicine is practised must be explored. This chapter 
outlines general features of biomedical culture including basic 
assumptions of the field, and typical characteristics of 
clinicians. This will be followed by an elaboration of the 
biomedical treatment of infertility to demonstrate the particular 
nature of these treatments. Finally, how clinicians construct 
risk will be detailed including the particular risks of 
conception-assisting technologies outlined in biomedical 
journals. Throughout this chapter, recent literature, primarily 
written by biomedical clinicians, which outlines treatment 
procedures and possible complications in a clinical setting will 
be used to construct biomedical clinicians' conceptions of risk.
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BIC^DICAL CULTURE
Biomedicine shapes and is shaped by our society— it mirrors 
and helps legitimate our capitalist, scientized, individualistic 
society. According to Berliner (1982), one of the main functions 
of biomedicine is to ensure that people maintain a level of 
productivity decided by our society. Biomedicine reaffirms our 
social mores by defining what constitutes wellness and disease, 
and affirming individuals' responsibility for their own health 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1992) .
Biomedicine can be defined as:
[T]he theory and practice of healing in which: (1)
invasive manipulations are used to restore/maintain the 
human organism at a statistically determined 
equilibrium; (2) the patients' role is largely passive 
and the healing is accomplished through external means;
(3) ill health and disequilibrium are assumed to be 
materially generated by specific elements such as 
bacteria, viruses, genetic malformations, parasites, 
etc. and can be empirically observed (Berliner, 1982:
62) .
The idea that disease is caused by biological agents which affect 
individual bodies works to ensure that other causes of illness, 
including environmentally and socially generated agents, are 
ignored (Berliner, 1982). Biomedical ideology also maintains 
clinicians' hegemony. Patients must rely on them to define and 
alleviate their illness since the causes of disease are invisible 
to the naked eye and unknown to those without the necessary 
education.
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Biomedical clinicians are trained to be objective and 
rational, guided by the principles of scientific evidence. This 
is customary and common despite the fact that the practice of 
biomedicine is full of emotionally-charged experiences, as the 
example of a physician's risk assessment previously described in 
Chapter Two showed (Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993).
One emotion which is definitely discouraged is uncertainty. 
The social organization of biomedical practice has within it the 
obligation to heal; to find out what ails a patient, and to cure 
it. Biomedicine, however, is not wholly scientific— there is 
much art to the science— and there are many illnesses which 
cannot be diagnosed or cured. Regardless, patients expect 
physicians to alleviate their suffering, and relating uncertainty 
to patients is discouraged in biomedical training. Certainty in 
medical decision making maintains professional power and the aura 
of biomedical competence (Katz, 1984). If biomedical clinicians 
admitted that they could not solve patients' problems these 
patients would soon be looking elsewhere for help.
Certainty also makes action possible. Biomedical ideology 
asserts that action is better than inaction. The obligation to 
alleviate patients' suffering means that decisive action must be 
taken through rapid diagnosis and the initiation of treatment 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Katz, 1984). There can be negative 
consequences to the concentration of biomedical knowledge: First, 
physicians may believe that patients are not capable of making
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decisions about their care, and may make decisions for them 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Dutton, 1988; Gillick, 1988). 
Second, people may become patients when it is unnecessary. There 
are high costs to unnecessary treatments for insurers, in lost 
time from work and from iatrogenic complications, and to 
patients' and their families' emotional states (Katz, 1984).
In our society, biomedicine has been accorded a great deal 
of autonomy through professional organizations and government 
legislation. The implementation of new biomedical techniques and 
technologies is governed by regulatory bodies comprised of 
biomedical clinicians and researchers who set their own standards 
most often in isolation from outside monitoring and questions 
(Beck, 1992). This means developments in biomedicine often occur 
without public consent, and we are left to deal with the 
consequences of their implementation. In what Beck calls a 
"noiseless social and cultural revolution" (1992; 207)
biomedicine has the power to change our social structure through 
technological developments of which new reproductive technologies 
are a poignant example.
It is important not to assume that the power of biomedical 
ideology rests solely with individual physicians. While they can 
and do exercise power in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, 
their training, professional certification, and treatment options 
are shaped by many factors. Individual physicians are subject to 
internal and external regulation and direction from researchers.
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hospitals, government, insurance companies, and pharmaceutical 
companies, as they are dependent upon these groups for their 
licensing, liability insurance, and their income (Beck, 1992; 
McCormack, 1996) . While it is far beyond the scope of this 
thesis to examine the organization of the biomedical power elite, 
it is important to note that individual physician decision making 
and action is influenced by many factors.
THE INFERTILITY SPECIALISTS
Biomedical practice is also far from monolithic. A 
physician's specialization highly influences his or her diagnosis 
and treatment of illness (Frankenberg, 1993) . According to Jay 
Katz (1984), specialization tends to narrow physicians' scope for 
diagnosis to areas covered by their training, and engenders 
confidence in the methods of the particular specialty to the 
exclusion of other methods. Couples seeking help with
infertility may not be able to explore all biomedical and non­
biomedical options because once treatment has started it will
take a particular course prescribed by the infertility 
specialist.
In the recent past, the treatment of infertility was
considered low status work in biomedicine. With the advent of
conception-assisting and other new reproductive technologies, 
however, specializing in infertility and reproductive
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endocrinology has become quite prestigious and financially 
lucrative (Scritchfield, 1989). In their study of conception- 
assisting technologies, Lasker and Borg (1987) described those 
who worked to help infertile couples in flattering terms saying 
they work very hard to help, sharing in the joys and 
disappointments of their patients. They also caution that many 
are highly ambitious physicians who are motivated by the 
challenges of being on the "frontiers of science" and are trying 
to gain prestige by reaching the top of their field. These 
clinicians feel there is no need to worry about present and 
future risks of using these groundbreaking technologies.
With conception-assisting technologies being imperfect 
solutions to the problem of infertility, physicians face 
emotional stresses and technological challenges. Biomedical 
clinicians invest a great deal of personal energy and money into 
the treatment of infertility. As a result they find failures 
frustrating and disappointing, not only because they know their 
patients have paid a great deal for the treatments (not only 
financially, but physically and emotionally) but also because it 
represents a personal failure to master the technology and the 
pathology which is making pregnancy impossible (Scritchfield, 
1989; Strickler, 1992). Another source of pressure is from 
members of the lay public who question the use of conception- 
assisting technologies. Clinicians must prove the efficacy of 
these technologies through their safe usage and resulting healthy
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babies to those who seek their help, and to their critics as well 
(Becker & Nachtigall, 1992). The pressure for success is 
intense, and physicians are often targets for the anger and 
disappointment of the couples they are trying to help, and 
members of the general public who question the use of these 
technologies (Lasker & Borg, 1987).
THE TREATMENT PROCESS
It is within this context that women enter infertility 
treatment. It is a context which is highly technological, with 
ambitious physicians who have been trained to treat women, who 
are not really ill (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991) . Biomedical 
training and practice has socialized clinicians to frame the 
problem of infertility in biomedical terms— with intervention 
towards the goal of pregnancy as the appropriate response. This 
medicalization of infertility has the result of closing off 
discussion of the non-medical context of infertility and possible 
solutions which do not fall into the biomedical realm (Solomon, 
1989; Strickler, 1992) .
Infertility specialists view themselves as relieving a 
disability— a couple's inability to have children (Becker & 
Nachtigall, 1991; Overall, 1993). They assert that infertility 
is a disease, an abnormality, which requires a biomedical cure. 
Diagnosis of infertility involves the identification of physical
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"defects" through the detection of one or more infertility 
factors. An infertility factor is a clinical term for a 
physiological discovery which may cause the infertility, usually 
consisting of physical deviations from a specified biomedical 
norm (Becker & Nachtigall, 1992). The diagnostic process can be 
quite invasive, including surgery and testing which may result in 
further reproductive impairments.
Once a diagnosis is given, action to overcome the ailment 
becomes the immediate next step. The obvious goal of treatment 
is to bring about a pregnancy and the birth of a healthy child. 
However, the norms and values of biomedicine train clinicians to 
see success only in terms of a pregnancy— not necessarily the 
birth of a healthy child (Scritchfield, 1989). This can and does 
result in disappointment for infertile couples whose only measure 
of success is a baby.
The diagnosis shapes which particular treatment is to be 
undertaken (Becker & Nachtigall, 1992). In many cases an 
infertility factor cannot be identified, but treatment is usually 
initiated because physicians (who have much at stake 
professionally and financially) are reluctant to tell a couple 
nothing can be done. Usually in such cases physicians rely on 
their past experiences and successes to shape treatment options, 
having the couple go through a progression of treatments until 
everything is attempted, the couple decides to stop, or they 
achieve a pregnancy.
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The lack of controlled studies as to the efficacy of
treatments for particular infertility practices reinforces this 
process since the physician cannot say definitively which 
treatments are successful (Becker and Nachtigall, 1994). Also 
there are inconsistencies in the delivery and success of
treatments between clinics. Blackwell et al. (1987), in their
evaluation of IVF programs, state that half of the IVF programs
established in the United States at the time of their study had 
no pregnancies. Also there is no specific credentialing process, 
and a lack of treatment standards, for IVF practice. Many 
practitioners have "learned" IVF procedures from visiting other 
practices for a short time and then attempting to open programs 
of their own.
In all cases, the treatment process is confined to the 
workings of the reproductive cycle. The process is therefore 
spaced out over time without the final results— a pregnancy—  
being known until several weeks after the final intervention. 
This also means that the couple and the physician are unable to 
bring about a rapid closure to the treatment process. This is 
especially true of IVF which has a low success rate. Upon its 
likely failure, both parties must wait until the next cycle to 
try again (Becker & Nachtigall, 1992). In a field which 
emphasizes mastery of the body and its systems, capitulation to 
natural reproductive cycles is partially viewed as a failure. 
With each part of the reproductive process controlled, the
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specialist moves closer to the goal of achieving mastery over the 
complex machinery of the body— a goal dictated by the tenets of 
biomedical training and ideology (Scritchfield, 1989).
Both clinicians and their patients believe infertility can 
be overcome through medical intervention. Both also favour 
taking action over pursuing other options such as waiting, or 
adoption. Physicians often point to the pressure to take 
biomedical action which they feel from couples who wish to have 
children. However, they themselves also play an important role 
in creating couples' expectations about treatments and their 
efficacy (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991). This happens in part 
because many of the treatments using conception-assisting 
technologies are consumer driven, paid for by the couple, and if 
a physician does not accommodate the couple's wish for another 
cycle of IVF or another test, they can always try the services of 
a competitor (Blackwell et al., 1987). This can happen at any 
point in the treatment process with physicians urging patients to 
try new techniques, or drugs, or continued IVF cycles. A recent 
article in the British Medical Journal states that there is no 
medical reason to limit the number of IVF cycles a woman 
undergoes if she has favourable indications for treatment. For 
these clinicians: "[the] main limiting factor is the emotional, 
physical, and financial cost, and most couples seem to feel 
satisfied that they have tried hard enough after two to three 
cycles" (Hull et al., 1992: 1468).
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This does not necessarily mean these infertility specialists 
are ambitious researchers, or that they are simply motivated by 
professional prestige or financial gain. The ideology of 
biomedicine promotes the idea that if there is something to be 
potentially gained from a treatment (and these researchers assert 
that the likelihood of success increases with the number of IVF 
cycles attempted) then there is no medical reason not to attempt 
it. However, many physicians while encouraging patients to 
pursue a pregnancy through biomedical intervention are also 
instrumental in applying limits to treatment (Becker & 
Nachtigall, 1992; Paulson & Sauer, 1991). Many infertile couples 
find it difficult to cease treatment because of their all- 
encompassing desire for a child, or because they fear later 
regret over the decision to stop. Physicians often help set 
boundaries on treatment options and sometimes cease treatment 
when patients do not. However, this does not mean patients will 
not go to other clinicians, even internationally, to undergo 
further treatments.
INFERTILITY SPECIALISTS' RISK CONSTRUCTION
Biomedical risk construction takes two forms: The first is a 
determination of relative risk for a particular illness which 
helps in the diagnostic process (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). For 
example, a woman who has had difficulty conceiving, has a
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malformed uterus, and was born before 1970, may be a DES 
daughter, meaning it is likely her physician will investigate 
this as a potential cause of her infertility (Boston Women's 
Health Book Collective, 1992) . The second involves the risks of 
tests and treatments which may have their own adverse outcomes. 
My discussion will focus on the latter of these risk 
determinations as it relates more centrally to the broader issues 
addressed here.
Biomedical determinations of risk involve both scientific, 
epidemiological calculations of risk probabilities, and 
interpreted, subjective constructions. Epidemiological risk 
involves using scientific methods to determine probabilities of 
adverse occurrences from the use of certain technologies or 
procedures. The risks are explained as a probability statistic, 
(i.e., there is a ten percent chance of an adverse outcome 
occurring from a particular medical intervention, or one in ten 
people are at risk of this outcome during a treatment cycle) . 
Clinical decision making based on these probabilities is also 
expressed scientifically in medical literature using the tools of 
economic analysis, decision trees, and cost-benefit analyses 
(Bunker, Barnes & Mosteller, 1977).
Proponents of epidemiological risk construction assert that 
while there is no truly scientific way of making decisions, these 
models provide a useful framework for decision making for 
individual physicians. They also aid in the development of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 9
standard methods for medical treatment, a starting place from 
which physicians can begin diagnosis and treatment (Bunker, 
Barnes & Mosteller, 1977) .
There are a few caveats to epidemiological determinations of 
risk. The first is that they have little predictive power: "Risk 
calculations almost always use historical data and mask the 
dubious assumption that the future will behave like the past" 
{Discover, 1996) . This is why they are often challenged by the 
lay public, and competing scientific communities. The second is 
that proper interpretation of these risk determinations requires 
an understanding of the dictates of probability statistics, 
something which both physicians and patients are often lacking 
(Gillick, 1988; Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993).
Biomedical decision-making models have also been criticized 
for neglecting the conditions under which decisions are really 
made. They are a confluence of many factors in which the 
epidemiological statistics play only a minor role, and social and 
cultural factors are most important (Katz, 1985) . Statistical 
determinations of risk are merely numbers which require 
interpretation by the biomedical clinician in order to be 
relevant to individual patient care, and the development of their 
own risk constructions (Kaufert & O'Neil, 1993) . Physicians rely 
upon empirical and clinical evidence in diagnosis and treatment 
decision making because their own experience is much more 
compelling than abstract medical literature (Lock, 1985).
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With experience the decision-making process becomes 
automatic in routine cases. But when options are obscured, or a 
novel situation arises, non-medical criteria influence decision 
making (Katz, 1985) . For example, a physician who encounters a 
particular problem will be more likely in the future to look for 
it in other patients no matter how rare its occurrence may be 
statistically (Gillick, 1988). Both personal and organizational 
attributes, from which physicians develop a style of practice and 
a working model for particular pathologies, are of influence.
Pearl Katz (1985), in her analysis of surgical decision 
making found that colleagues, hospital organizational structure, 
departmental hierarchy, competition, the lure of increased 
referrals, and ideas of appropriate income were all non-medical 
influences on physicians' medical decisions. In her study. Lock 
found that personal attributes of individual physicians also 
affected their conceptions, diagnosis and treatment of menopause. 
She cites many influences including age, gender, subspecialty, 
type of training, professional literature read, proximity to 
teaching hospitals and the demographics of the clinical 
population, which shape biomedical clinicians' conceptions of 
illness (1985). These influences also shape infertility 
specialists' constructions of the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies.
Non-medical influences on biomedical clinicians' risk 
constructions should not be underestimated. These are the people
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who decide which treatments will be used for infertile couples, 
and help shape patients' determinations of acceptable risks. 
Their interests in the technology shape its development and use. 
Being both financially and professionally lucrative, conception- 
assisting technologies will not likely be abandoned. Proposed 
new Canadian legislation to curb the commercialization of the 
technologies, which will also limit their use, is meeting with 
resistance from practitioners, as does much government regulation 
of biomedical technology.
Those in control of conception-assisting technologies 
demonstrate some of the characteristics Dutton (1988) found in 
her analysis of medical innovations. Biomedical clinicians show 
technological optimism, believing that biomedicine has the 
ability to overcome obstacles to the success of the technologies 
through continued research and mastery of the techniques. They 
also believe the full benefits of the technology are nearer and 
greater than imagined at the outset. For example, some 
physicians believe that IVF will soon replace regular human 
reproduction through the development of safer and more 
predictable artificial wombs (Corea, 1985). Those in biomedicine 
also tend to underestimate the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies. Some practitioners feel that more studies, or a 
moratorium on techniques, will hurt infertile couples, and are 
unnecessary since significant risks have not been detected. Such 
thinking leads them into a statistical trap of believing that no
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evidence of risks is the same as evidence of no risks (Dutton, 
1988).
Those making decisions about the safety of conception- 
assisting technologies are doing so on tenuous ground evidenced 
by the dearth of medical literature on their risks. Biomedical 
clinicians using these technologies assert that scientific 
evidence has not been compelling enough to curb the use of 
fertility drugs and IVF. The overriding risk construction for 
infertility specialists is that despite the paucity of controlled 
research into its efficacy and safety, the benefits of 
conception-assisting technologies outweigh the costs 
(Scritchfield, 1989). They will proceed with the use of 
conception-assisting technologies and insist that they are safe 
until scientific evidence definitively proves otherwise.
The adoption of conception-assisting technologies despite a 
lack of evidence proving their efficacy is, according to McKinlay 
(1982), a normal part of the "career" of medical innovations. In 
his examination of how innovations become part of established 
biomedical practice, he delineates seven stages through which 
medical innovations typically pass. These stages are useful in 
explaining the adoption of conception-assisting technologies as 
standard procedures of the treatment of infertility.
Typically, medical innovations begin as "promising reports" 
in the mass media and medical journals (like the birth of the 
first IVF baby in 1978) (McKinlay, 1982: 235-236). This leads to
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the use of the innovation on a small group of patients in a few 
medical institutions, and if somewhat successful allows the 
innovation to proceed through subsequent stages.
In the second stage professional adoption of the innovation 
by a wide range of physicians, biomedical associations and 
biomedical institutions occurs. It is fueled by physicians' 
desires to respond to the needs of their patients, peer pressure 
from the early users of the innovation, and the desire to appear 
more up-to-date, scientific and professional in the delivery of 
care. In the case of conception-assisting technologies, they 
were likely adopted because there were few other options 
available to physicians to help infertile couples conceive. But, 
McKinlay states that the information used for the decision to 
adopt medical innovations at this stage is still seriously 
deficient. It is generally based on small observational studies, 
the experience of early users, and information provided by the 
manufacturer of the innovation itself (who have a vested interest 
in widening its use). Decisions to adopt innovations are rarely 
done on the basis of randomized controlled trials which are 
considered the best way to judge efficacy (McKinlay, 1982) .
The wide-spread biomedical adoption of an innovation leads 
to the third stage marked by public acceptance and state 
endorsement (in terms of insurance coverage and regulation). 
With general acceptance of the innovation comes the entrenchment 
of the procedure or technology in the biomedical armamentarium.
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But it must be remembered that this adoption has been guided by
biomedical interests.
Having once fostered acceptance and even a demand among 
the public, these interests are in a position to 
satisfy it, while appealing to a demand that they may 
have created as justification for their activities with 
respect to the innovation [sic](McKinlay, 1982; 244) .
And, even at this stage there has still been little formal
evaluation of the innovation. This is true of conception-
assisting technologies which are generally accepted (though not
unquestioningly) but still have not had their efficacy and safety
rigorously evaluated. Also, physicians now have a constituency
they can appeal to (infertile couples in the case of conception-
assisting technologies) to further advance the career of the
innovation since they will demand that use of the innovation
continue.
When these three stages have occurred the innovation moves 
into the fourth stage becoming a standard procedure. It is now 
generally accepted as the most appropriate way to deal with a 
particular problem. Now it becomes difficult to question its 
effectiveness since there is ample observational evidence (e.g., 
babies born using conception-assisting technologies) to support 
its use. According to McKinlay (1982) though these still do not 
replace methodologically sound random controlled trials.
This is the stage conception-assisting technologies have 
reached. From here, their career should move on to stage five.
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randomized controlled trials, when the technologies will finally 
be evaluated for efficacy and safety. They will then likely 
proceed to stage six, professional denunciation, where trials 
finding negative results are attacked by those who wish to
maintain the use of conception-assisting technologies. Their 
future will be decided based on the most compelling evidence. 
Regardless, the career of conception-assisting technologies will 
eventually move on to the seventh stage of erosion or
discreditation. At this point the technologies will either be 
abandoned because they are unsafe, or ineffective, or because a 
new innovation has been found to replace them. The latter 
consequence is most likely because unless there is a scandal 
(e.g., as in the cases of DES or thalidomide) biomedical
clinicians will only abandon the use of conception-assisting
technologies if there is a replacement therapy (McKinlay, 1992) .
It would seem then that the use of unproven (using 
methodologically sound random controlled trials) medical 
innovation is part of the normal course of "doing medicine". 
This is further exemplified by the ideology of biomedicine which 
favours decisive action to remedy illness. Risk-taking to 
achieve that end is often rewarded, especially when it is 
successful (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994). Medical aggressiveness 
is favoured over inaction, so the biggest risk for biomedical 
clinicians may be doing nothing to help infertile couples who 
seek their help.
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In summary, biomedical clinicians' risk constructions are a 
complex amalgam of many factors. Epidemiological calculations 
and scientific evidence mingle with empirical and clinical 
evidence and the personal situation and characteristics of the 
clinician to form his or her determination of the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies. It is important to remember 
that there may be quite a split between what appears in medical 
literature and the actual working lives of physicians. However 
the overriding risk construction of those using and writing about 
conception-assisting technologies is one of optimism and 
minimization, with many texts not pointing to risks at all, or 
representing them as routine (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994; Dodson, 
et. al., 1986; Scritchfield, 1989). For the woman experiencing 
side-effects which have an impact on her daily life, or requiring 
hospitalization, they are hardly routine; however, her individual 
experience of health in an intimate, longitudinal sense stands in 
opposition to the experience of her physician who sees a large 
number of people and handles complications as part of the work of 
providing care (Frankenberg, 1993).
THE RISKS OF CONCEPTION-ASSISTING TECHNOLOGIES
Not all biomedical clinicians writing about conception- 
assisting technologies entirely underestimate their risks. A few 
articles discussing complications and risks can be found in
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biomedical journals published in the last decade or so. 
Blackwell and his colleagues in an article called "Are We 
Exploiting the Infertile Couple?" (1987) contend that the current 
practice of infertility treatment is not free from medical and 
non-medical problems. They believe that the technologies 
themselves have not "withstood the test of time" to become 
established in the biomedical armamentarium (Blackwell et al., 
1987; 737). They also believe that many physicians are
misrepresenting their credentials and their training, to offer 
infertility treatment, and others are not providing couples with 
true success rates. While they do not speak of the risks of the 
treatment for couples, they certainly point out that the current 
organization and practice of treating infertility makes risks 
more likely, as those using the techniques may not be adequately 
trained or monitored.
Most of the biomedical literature on the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies has been biomedically centered, 
being drug and process related (Becker & Nachtigall, 1994) . 
Among the most comprehensive is a recent study by Schenker and 
Ezra (1994) which details the complications which may arise from 
the use of conception-assisting technologies. Though they 
caution that there is a wide range of complications, they 
nonetheless endorse the use of these techniques as a potential 
solution to infertility. In a previous study they concluded 
that, "...IVF/ET [embryo transfer] is not an empirical treatment
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any more and is a relatively safe procedure, although it should 
be used only when properly indicated" (Ezra & Schenker, 1993: 
127) . By relatively safe they mean in comparison to surgical 
infertility treatments (which have many risks as well), and they 
caution that because of the many risks to IVF, less invasive 
measures should be used if possible (Ezra & Schenker, 1993).
The risks they do detail in their 1994 article appear quite 
extensive to the non-biomedically trained eye. Using the jargon 
of the discipline (which I have tried my best to avoid) they go 
on to list numerous complications which can occur during the use 
of IVF. These include:
• Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS) which can be either 
moderate or severe. OHSS can cause many complications 
including blood clots, renal disorders, pituitary 
complications, cancer and death. The reported incidences of 
moderate OHSS is three to four percent, and severe OHSS is 0.1 
to 0.2 percent. In data collected through world registries 
(in which many practitioners do not participate) it was found 
that nearly 100,000 hyperstimulated cycles occur every year 
(Schenker & Ezra, 1994: 412-413).
• Complications from the use of anesthesia including pneumonia, 
gastric perforation, hypoxia and death (arising from general 
anesthesia); bladder dysfunction, neural injury, backaches and 
inadvertent spinal insertion (from regional anesthesia). 
While these risks are not specific to the use of Conception-
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assisting technologies, they are nonetheless present (Schenker 
& Ezra, 1994: 414-415).
• During egg retrieval injuries can occur to the abdominal wall, 
blood vessels, intestine, uterus, or bladder. The process can 
also result in severe injuries resulting in additional surgery 
or death (Schenker & Ezra, 1994: 414-416).
• There can be risks resulting from the infestation of the 
culture medium used to house the ova and sperm once removed 
from the body. This can result in the woman receiving those 
gametes or embryos infected with hepatitis or AIDS (Schenker & 
Ezra, 1994: 414, 416).
• There can also be complications from any resulting pregnancies 
including an increased rate of spontaneous abortions, ectopic 
pregnancies, multiple pregnancies, toxaemia, bleeding, 
anaemia, gestational diabetes, low birth weight and 
hypertension. Other complications include preterm deliveries, 
and higher perinatal illness and death rates (Schenker & Ezra, 
1994 : 416-418).
Another area of risk highlighted in the biomedical
literature results from the use of fertility drugs. In 1992 a
group called the Collaborative Ovarian Cancer Group (COCG) found 
that white women with fertility problems who used fertility drugs 
had a higher risk of certain kinds of ovarian cancer and border­
line tumors (Spirtas, Kaufman & Alexander, 1993). The studies 
however were not enough to persuade physicians to discontinue
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their use. Instead a biomedical debate is beginning as to the
safety of fertility drugs.
Although the provocative findings of the COCG papers 
justify an increased level of concern about the
possible causal relationship between fertility drug 
usage and ovarian cancer, more basic and
epidemiological research is needed to put them into 
perspective (Spirtas, Kaufman & Alexander, 1993: 292) .
This is a particularly telling example of biomedical conceptions 
of risk; instead of using preliminary and imperfect research as a
basis to protect the safety of patients, they prefer to continue
with the use of techniques until more definitive information 
proving safety or risk is available. While Spritas and his 
colleagues advise that patients be informed of this possible 
increased risk, they feel there is no cause for alarm (1993) . 
However, ignoring early concerns raised about other medical 
innovations has led to many people suffering iatrogenic 
complications (Dutton, 1988).
Another risk identified in biomedical writings relates to 
the costs of conception-assisting technologies. The financial, 
physical and emotional costs to couples undergoing treatment 
while certainly mentioned, were not considered paramount. The 
costs warned of were to physicians— the considerable financial 
costs, time commitment and resources needed to sustain a viable 
IVF program (Dodson, et. al., 1986). While these are certainly 
important factors for physicians to consider, these risks must
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surely be weighed against the enormous benefits these physicians 
receive.
Other non-medical risks were rarely discussed in the 
biomedical literature. Social, ethical, political, and economic 
risks were usually only briefly mentioned, if at all. The 
unequal distribution of these services to predominately white, 
well-educated, upper-income, heterosexual couples, is not 
discussed. The impact on society of treatments which have the 
power to fundamentally alter human reproduction is seldom 
mentioned. Risk appears to be viewed only through a narrow 
biomedical lens, abstracted from the workings of our society. 
This is so despite the fact that those who control conception- 
assisting technologies have considerable influence over the 
development and directions of these innovations, right down to 
controlling information given to patients, and subsequently their 
risk constructions.
CONCLUSION
In our society biomedical clinicians are accorded a great 
deal of prestige, and they possess a great deal of power. They 
are responsible for our standards and definitions of illness and 
health, and the treatments necessary to ensure our well-being and 
societal productivity. As a society we rely on biomedicine to 
provide these services, and are often quite accepting of its
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privileged position. This is reflected in the level of autonomy 
physicians have to make decisions about the development and use 
of technologies like those which aid in conception and the 
medicalization of infertility.
The power of biomedicine over the definition and treatment 
of infertility is not uncontested. As was discussed previously, 
action by feminists (and indeed other interest groups like 
patients' rights groups and health care worker trade unions) has 
led to significant changes in biomedical practice. Specifically 
in Canada, critique and resistance to some technologies led to 
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies. The Royal 
Commission served as a form of societal comment on conception- 
assisting technologies, and laws are currently (albeit slowly) 
being proposed to better reflect the public's wishes regarding 
the development and use of these technologies. Resistance by the 
biomedical community to such reforms is often strong, however, 
and as long as infertile couples choose conception-assisting 
technologies some of the power of biomedicine will remain. But 
not all physicians agree with the current provision of 
conception-assisting technologies, meaning challenges and changes 
from within biomedicine are also occurring.
Once couples begin exploring biomedical options for the 
diagnosis and treatment of their infertility, non-biomedical 
options effectively are shut off. Instead, a particular course 
of action dictated by an infertility specialist will take
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precedence. This reflects the ideology of biomedicine, which 
encourages practitioners to take decisive action, moving rapidly 
from diagnosis to treatment or cure whenever possible. The use 
of conception-assisting technologies to "cure" infertility not 
only potentially helps an infertile couple, but also places the 
physician in a high-tech, prestigious and lucrative biomedical 
specialty where he or she has much to gain.
The poor success rates of these technologies also make this 
position a difficult one for physicians who have been trained to 
master the machinery of the body in order to find pathologies, 
and bypass, or eliminate them. The inability to bring about a 
pregnancy in an infertile woman is often viewed as a personal 
failure. It also makes infertility specialists targets of the 
anger and frustration of the couples they are trying to help, and 
the general public who question the successes and safety of these 
technologies.
The treatment process for infertility has as an underlying 
premise the notion that infertility is a disease which must be 
found and bypassed (since the available technology cannot 
eliminate it). The diagnostic process seeks to identify 
infertility factors which are physical deviations of the 
reproductive cycle and organs from a predetermined norm. 
Diagnosis shapes which treatment will be undertaken. But since 
infertility is often difficult to diagnose and the efficacy of 
many treatments for particular problems has not been identified.
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treatment is often empirical, based on a physician's previous 
successes.
With both biomedical clinicians and their patients believing 
in the efficacy of infertility treatment using conception- 
assisting technologies, the potential for an unlimited scope to 
treatments is likely. Biomedical clinicians play an important 
role in their patients' expectations, however, often urging them 
to continue with treatments, hoping, for instance, that the next 
IVF cycle will work for them. Physicians can also play an 
important role in helping couples stop treatment. Their 
influence is tempered by many factors including their belief in 
the efficacy of treatment, financial and reputational issues, and 
the user-pay system which gives patients the power to take "their 
business" elsewhere.
All of these factors also influence their construction of 
risk. Biomedical determinations of risk involve both statistical 
epidemiological estimates, marked by scientific rationality, and 
interpreted subjective constructions in which many societal and 
individual factors play an important role. Epidemiological 
calculations, empirical and clinical evidence, and physicians' 
financial and political interests all influence biomedical 
clinicians' construction of risk.
In its risk construction, biomedicine asserts its optimism 
about conception-assisting technologies. Despite the fact that 
there have been very few studies into the safety of these
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technologies, it is contended that there are no significant risks 
to women or any offspring. There is a confusion of the findings 
of no proof of risks with proof of no risk. Just because risks 
have not been found, does not mean that they do not exist; 
however, biomedical ideology dictates that technologies which can 
help alleviate suffering should be used, since the benefits 
outweigh the costs, at least until the costs become known. To 
date, the biomedical literature on risks has not been compelling 
enough for practitioners to curb the use of these technologies.
Biomedical writings have identified some risks to 
conception-assisting technologies, centring almost entirely on 
biomedical concerns and complications arising from the treatments 
themselves. These include: (1) the practice of treatment itself, 
from the credentials and methods of clinicians, to reported 
success rates, and the many costs of offering IVF programs; and 
(2) side-effects of various interventions like ovarian 
hyperstimulation syndrome, complications from anesthesia, 
injuries to the body from egg retrieval, and embryo insertion, 
and complications from any resulting pregnancies. Detailing of 
risks is tentative though, because in all cases the authors 
assert that conception-assisting technologies are very useful and 
important methods to help infertile couples. Again, the benefits 
seem to outweigh the costs.
Writings in biomedical journals also neglect important risks 
which have been identified by other interest groups— the
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emotional and financial costs for patients, and social, 
political, and ethical risks. They do not discuss the social 
context within which conception-assisting technologies are 
invented and used, and the larger risks to society as a whole 
from their use. The reason for this is that while the sphere of 
influence of biomedicine is quite great, these conceptions of 
subjective, non-individualistic, unscientific concerns are not 
seen to be central to biomedical decision making and practice 
which is ostensibly based upon objective, scientific, unemotional 
rationality. It is a discipline which views technology as 
largely benevolent, and one whose members are heavily invested in 
the use of conception-assisting technologies.





The major purpose of this research was to analyze and 
interpret the conceptions of risk constructed about conception- 
assisting technologies by feminist analysts, infertile women 
seeking treatment and biomedical clinicians. I have argued that 
each group holds rich and complex conceptions of the risks of 
these new reproductive technologies— which both reinforce and 
reflect the social context of their concerns and interests.
Probably the most influential risk construction is that of 
biomedical clinicians who are responsible for the development and 
implementation of conception-assisting technologies. Clinicians 
are part of a self-regulating, highly powerful group which 
controls much of the information about these technological 
developments. They are responsible for the so-called objective 
and rational technical determinations of risk which frame most of 
the debates concerning the acceptability of their technologies. 
They are also largely entrusted with defining our societal 
notions of illness and health, and the treatments necessary to 
ensure we maintain our standard of well-being. This power and
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autonomy makes for an environment where the development and uses 
of technologies are given almost unlimited scope.
Biomedical clinicians themselves are trained to reinforce 
these norms by taking decisive action and using technology to 
treat and cure illness. The use of conception-assisting 
technologies is a good example of this ideology in action, as a 
social condition— involuntary childlessness— is medicalized and 
turned into an illness. In using biomedical treatments for 
infertility, practitioners are part of a high-tech prestigious 
occupation where there is much to gain. Reputations and finances 
are enhanced for biomedical clinicians who are responsible for 
ensuring that infertile couples attempt to fulfill a potent 
societal norm— procreation.
The overriding concerns of infertility specialists are two­
fold: First, they wish to help infertile couples have the
children they desperately desire. Second, they have much to gain 
personally and professionally from the use of conception- 
assisting technologies— a good salary, prestige, research 
publications and funding, and personal satisfaction. These 
things all influence how they construct the risks surrounding the 
use of conception-assisting technologies. Their notions of risk 
are an amalgam of technically derived epidemiological statistics, 
clinical experience, personal characteristics and information 
gained from biomedical journals. They are heavily influenced by 
biomedical ideology which dictates that everything that can be
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done to alleviate suffering should be, and that technological 
interventions are extremely beneficial to assist in conception 
for infertile couples.
Biomedical conceptions of risk are also narrow, encompassing 
only strictly biomedical concerns. Their risk assessments only 
deal with the health risks which may arise as complications to 
the treatments, such as side-effects from anesthesia or ovarian 
hyper-stimulation. They do not discuss the many emotional and 
financial risks to couples, the societal risks arising from the 
potential of conception-assisting technologies to change the 
nature of human reproduction, or the risk that the medicalization 
of infertility entrenches our pronatalist social mores.
This narrow conception of risk occurs precisely because 
these are the values which biomedical clinicians themselves hold. 
If child-free living were more acceptable, many infertile couples 
would not be bothered by infertility. If many causes of 
infertility were prevented through basic public health 
initiatives such as education about sexually transmitted diseases 
and better environmental safety provisions, there would be few 
people in need of biomedicine's technological interventions. 
Biomedical assessments of the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies reflect biomedical beliefs in the efficacy of these 
technologies and reinforce physicians' control over definitions 
and treatments of infertility.
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The power and control of infertility treatment has been 
rather easy for biomedical clinicians to secure. Infertile 
couples who seek treatment share many of the same beliefs as the 
clinicians who help them. They see their infertility as a 
disease which they need biomedicine to cure. This conception of 
infertility does not merely arise from the influences of 
biomedicine, but is also a product of our pronatalist society. 
We strongly believe that married couples should, and should want 
to, reproduce. This is especially true for women, for whom 
mothering is thought to be a natural and preferred role. Many of 
our beliefs, and indeed our social structures are built around 
the importance of having and raising children. These beliefs 
help make childlessness (both voluntary and involuntary) a 
stigmatizing condition.
For infertile women the fact that they cannot have children 
makes this stigma more profound, as they also hold pronatalist 
beliefs. They internalize others' beliefs that they are 
abnormal, and that they should be blamed for their inability to 
have children. Infertile couples who seek treatment also share 
with couples who can have children the same parenthood 
motivations and the desire to have genetically-related children 
to nurture.
The intense desire to have children, coupled with the stigma 
of infertility, leads to contemplating using biomedical 
treatments to help find a solution— that is, have a baby.
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Infertile couples who seek treatment willingly participate in the 
medicalization of infertility because the pervasiveness of 
biomedical ideology makes this the culturally-prescribed route. 
Infertile couples who seek biomedical solutions have high 
expectations o-f conception-assisting technologies.
This social context informs the decision-making process for 
infertile couples seeking treatment, and their construction of 
risk. Decisions to use conception-assisting technologies involve 
weighing the costs and benefits of action and inaction. This 
means contemplating the risks of doing nothing to have 
biologically related children— stigmatization and regret at not 
trying biomedical treatments. For those who seek treatment, 
these are risks they cannot live with. While they understand the 
physical, emotional and financial risks of treatment, the 
benefit, a baby, is considered priceless. By choosing to use 
conception-assisting technologies infertile couples are 
participating in a high-stakes gamble, where the risks are high, 
but so is the possible reward. The decision is not a fixed one, 
and is constantly being re-evaluated throughout treatment. 
Eventually the benefits— a child, or acceptance of infertility—  
or the risks, which become too great, lead to the end of 
treatment.
The risk constructions of infertile women seeking treatment 
very much reflect and reinforce the dominant ideologies of our 
society, and the great value we place on married couples having
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children. The stigma of infertility and the central place 
medical solutions occupy in this social and physical problem, all 
shape their risk constructions. Those who seek treatment take 
great risks to their health, and their emotional and financial 
well-being, to fulfill the goals they have been socialized to 
desire.
Both infertile women seeking treatment and biomedical 
clinicians' risk constructions help maintain a way of life which 
reinforces existing social relations and ideologies about 
reproduction, biomedicine and technology. Feminist analysts, by 
contrast, assess the risks of conception-assisting technologies 
with the goal of achieving social change. Feminist analysts have 
written extensively about new reproductive technologies and their 
effects on women as a group. The overriding goal of the feminist 
movement is to eliminate the sexist oppression of women through 
change to our cultural concepts, language and ways of knowing the 
world, which currently maintain the practice of male power over 
women. They assert that true liberation for women will not occur 
unless and until we have absolute control over our bodies.
Feminists argue that the choices made by infertile women to 
use conception-assisting technologies must be analyzed to assess 
the constraints to their free and informed decision making. The 
risks of conception-assisting technologies are constructed by 
feminist analysts with an underlying question guiding the 
assessment: Do conception-assisting technologies aid in women's
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autonomy, or do they further enslave women to the role of 
childbearing?
To answer this question means assessing more than the risks 
to the individual women who use the technologies, though the 
feminist literature includes an extensive analysis of these 
dangers. It also means evaluating these technologies within 
their broader social context to examine how their use perpetuates 
certain ideas about women, their capabilities and their proper 
roles. Feminist constructions of risk therefore differ 
significantly from more traditional risk analyses.
Feminist analysts assert that conception-assisting 
technologies are full of known and unknown risks. The women who 
use them are "living laboratories" since many of the techniques 
and drugs remain untested, and their long-term safety remains a 
mystery (Rowland, 1992). Also, using conception-assisting 
technologies involves many financial, physical and emotional 
costs to women, since they are very expensive, involve vast 
amounts of time and energy, and are quite invasive.
They also see risks to women as a group arising from 
conception-assisting technologies. The high cost of treatments 
means that they are available to only those who can afford them. 
Lesbians and single women are also often denied treatment as 
biomedical clinicians who control the technology act as social 
gate-keepers deciding who should, and who should not, be able to 
reproduce. Conception-assisting technologies also perpetuate the
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medicalization of social problems and take attention away from 
the prevention of infertility which is often much less heroic, 
invasive and expensive, and would mean that women would have the 
freedom to reproduce without medical intervention. Finally, 
feminist analysts assert that the provision of conception- 
assisting technologies entrenches women's primary role as mothers 
to genetically-related children in the context of the nuclear 
family; that is, it does nothing to change the current social 
relations which make infertility a stigmatizing condition. 
Instead of changing society to accommodate the involuntarily 
childless, conception-assisting technologies change the infertile 
to accommodate society.
Feminist analysts' discussions of risk do not end with their 
assessment of the technology. An integral part of feminist 
analysis is the organization of resistance to the current state 
of affairs by responding to these risks with prescriptions for 
change. Feminist analysts are not trying to maintain our current 
way of life, they want to transform it. How this is to be 
achieved, however, is a point of contention among feminists 
writing about this area.
One group feels that the risks of the technologies are too 
great for women and the technologies should be banned. They feel 
that infertile women should overcome their socialized beliefs 
about child-bearing and reject these developments. These 
feminist analysts also assert that the path new reproductive
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technologies are currently taking is leading to dangerous new 
innovations which will place ever increasing control over 
reproduction in the hands of male-dominated scientific, 
pharmaceutical and biomedical organizations. This will continue 
to inhibit the reproductive autonomy of all women.
Another group of feminist analysts disagree with this 
response. They see it as denying infertile women the opportunity 
to procreate since this desire, regardless of its roots, is quite 
genuine. They also assert that women and many men will not allow 
the full-scale, technological take-over of reproduction prophesied 
by those advocating a ban of the technology. They assert that 
there is a historical precedent of women's resistance to 
incursions on their reproductive autonomy which is sure to 
continue. They do agree with those advocating the ban that the 
current provision of conception-assisting technologies is quite 
risky and that changes must be made to ensure that infertile 
women make free and informed choices, and that the development 
and use of these technologies promotes and ensures women's full 
reproductive autonomy.
WHAT IS MISSING: SOCIETAL-INFORMED CHOICE
While feminist analysts advocate necessary changes to the 
delivery of conception-assisting technologies to promote the goal 
of women's informed and autonomous decision making, they too
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neglect an important element of the debate on technological 
acceptance. How do decisions about the development of technology 
occur in the first place? In the case of conception-assisting 
technologies, no government or biomedical professional body has 
approached the public, asking if they want technologies like 
these to be developed. There was no societal debate about the 
risks and benefits of conception-assisting technologies before 
they were implemented as standard biomedical treatments. 
Instead, the technologies were thrust upon us, touted as medical 
miracles, leaving the public, and our governments to then deal 
with the many ethical, physical, financial, and other dangers 
these new techniques presented (Beck, 1992; Dutton, 1988).
As individuals, we have little control over the creation of 
technological developments, which means we initially have lictle 
control over the risks. Biomedical and scientific institutions 
take a paternalistic attitude toward the lay public, creating 
technologies which are "for our own good", and they assume there 
is a societal consensus about the importance of technological 
developments. They have decided what we need, and in so doing 
have the power to radically alter the nature of human 
reproduction.
When groups in society decide that the risks of a particular 
development need further exploration, or are too great, we as a 
society have a dialogue about the technology usually only after 
it is in use. The Royal Commission on New Reproductive
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Technologies is a good example of this. The Royal Commission 
arose from the intensive lobby efforts of the Canadian Coalition 
for a Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, a 
nation-wide coalition of women's, health and other groups and 
individuals who were concerned about the course new reproductive 
technologies were taking in Canadian society (Eichler, 1993). 
Conception-assisting and other reproductive technologies were 
already in widespread use by the time the Royal Commission was 
launched in 1989. As a society we could only react to these 
technologies after their implementation since we did not have the 
opportunity to shape their creation.
Feminist analysts and others concerned about the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies need to analyze the decision­
making structures in biomedical, scientific, and corporate 
organizations. If we are to have control over the nature of 
technological developments then there must be mechanisms of 
societal-informed choice in place. This means having knowledge 
about the risks and benefits associated with these innovations, 
and ensuring that those who will bear the major burden of the 
risks (in this case women) and the general public have a greater 
voice in the direction and regulation of new forms of 
reproductive technology. Societal-informed choice means more 
than reacting to existing technologies; it involves the 
democratic shaping of new innovations, and achieving "...social
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control over the welfare of the body politic" (Dutton, 1988: 
252) .
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While much was learned from this analysis of the risks of 
conception-assisting technologies constructed by biomedical 
clinicians, infertile women seeking treatment, and feminist 
analysts, the findings lead to many more questions and 
possibilities for further research in the following areas.
• The limitations of a literature review could be overcome 
through research which asks members of each group directly 
what their conceptions of risk are, and the sources of their 
risk information.
• Infertile couples are the group that is most directly affected 
by the risks of conception-assisting technologies. More 
research is needed to understand their views about the 
technologies and their risks. Also, longitudinal research 
which follows them through and beyond the infertility 
diagnosis and treatment process would be beneficial as it 
would illuminate the influences on their risk constructions 
and decision-making to see how these change over time.
• All of the groups in this study had reasons for participating 
in the risk and technological acceptance debate. Research 
about the risk constructions of the lay public surrounding
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conception-assisting technologies would also be useful for 
seeing whether the risk constructions of biomedical 
clinicians, infertile couples, and feminist analysts influence 
and/or reflect more general or societal viewpoints on these 
technologies.
• The decision-making process regarding the use of conception- 
assisting technologies by infertile women is a complicated 
one. More research is needed to understand the many factors 
which influence women's decisions to use conception-assisting 
technologies. Determining the role a woman's partner plays in 
shaping treatment decisions is especially important. 
Longitudinal research following couples through the process of 
diagnosis and treatment would be very beneficial.
• There is also little research into couples who choose not to 
treat their infertility. Do they feel the treatments are too 
risky? Are their parenthood motivations different than 
infertile couples who seek treatment? Do they adopt instead? 
Understanding the risk conceptions, and decision-making 
processes of couples who do not seek treatment using 
conception-assisting technologies would provide further depth 
to the existing research in this area.
• The biomedical constructions of risk also need more detail. 
This analysis discussed infertility specialists' risk 
constructions without fully delineating the complicated 
organizational influences on their risk decisions. How do
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powerful groups like pharmaceutical and insurance companies, 
professional regulating bodies, and the scientific research 
elite construct the risks of conception-assisting 
technologies, and what are their vested interests for doing 
so?
• Is the feminist message about the risks of conception- 
assisting technologies reaching infertile women? Research is 
needed to gauge the influence of feminist writings and 
activism on new reproductive technologies to see whether the 
message is reaching individual women and shaping their 
decision making.
• While feminists certainly talk about risk, they have not yet 
developed a feminist method of assessing risks and analyzing 
risk construction. Such theoretical models need to be 
developed so technological and environmental dangers can be 
identified, assessed and explained in terms of how they affect 
women as a distinct group in society. A good starting place 
for this may be found in the emerging literature on feminist 
ethics, especially writings focusing on biomedical practices 
(for example. Overall, 1987; Overall, 1993 & Sherwin, 1989).
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first
comprehensive analysis of the risk constructions of biomedical
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clinicians, infertile women seeking treatment, and feminist 
analysts— three important groups involved in the debate over the 
efficacy, safety and acceptability of conception-assisting 
technologies. This comparative analysis of differing risk
constructions also makes way for more comparative sociological 
analyses of different groups' risk assessments of technological 
innovations.
In examining the social, political, economic and cultural 
influences on each groups' risk constructions, this study
illuminates the type of society each group wants to promote or
maintain, and their reasons for doing so. It shows that
assessments of risk are not merely statistical proclamations, or 
lay opinions about safety. They are about technological 
acceptance, and they reflect the many vested interests 
individuals and groups have for constructing risks the way they 
do. Exploring the risk constructions of various groups 
demonstrates that risk is political; it is not just about the 
amount of danger we are willing to accept, but about the kind of 
society that we want to live in.
Infertile women seeking treatment and biomedical clinicians 
assert that the risks of conception-assisting technologies are 
well worth the benefit; the possibility of a child. Their risk 
construction reflects and maintains our pronatalist, medicalized 
society which seeks technological fixes for social problems. 
Feminist analysts, by contrast, feel that the risks of
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conception-assisting technologies are unacceptable for the women 
who use them, and for the reproductive autonomy of all women. 
Some feminist analysts feel that conception-assisting 
technologies, especially I VF, should be banned. Others do not 
want to take this drastic measure since infertile women do 
benefit from these technologies. Instead they advocate massive 
reforms to the organization of biomedicine and the delivery of 
conception-assisting technologies. These feminist analysts do 
not fear technological innovations per se, but instead see that 
technology can benefit women as a group if the social relations 
which govern its development and use are radically altered. But 
they neglect in their analysis the notion of societal-informed 
consent, where democratic institutions not only react to 
technological innovations, but also shape their development and 
implementation so that debates over the acceptability of 
technological innovations occur before women's well-being and 
autonomy are put at risk. In contrast, I suggest that we need a 
broader basis for decision-making about technology where the 
often difficult political debate about risks and acceptability 
are at the forefront, enabling full societal participation in the 
creation and use of technological developments.
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